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ROADBLOCKS TO REMEDIES: RECENTLY
DEVELOPED BARRIERS TO RELIEF FOR ALIENS
INJURED BY U.S. OFFICIALS, CONTRARY TO THE
FOUNDERS' INTENT
Gwynne L. Skinner *
INTRODUCTION
The founders of the United States, especially those who wrote
the Constitution and the subsequent First Judiciary Act,' wanted
to ensure that aliens who were victims of torts in violation of the
law of nations (now commonly referred to as customary interna-
tional law2) had the ability to seek redress in federal court for the
injuries they suffered.3 Providing remedies for violations of the
law of nations to aliens was important in order to demonstrate
that the young country took the law of nations seriously and to
prevent foreign conflicts, some of which might lead to war. At the
time of the nation's founding, just as it does now, international
* Assistant Professor, Willamette University College of Law. MSt. (LL.M. equiva-
lent), International Human Rights Law, Oxford University; J.D., University of Iowa; M.A.,
University of Iowa; B.A., Political Science, University of Northern Iowa. The author wish-
es to thank Professors Beth Stephens and Chimdne Keitner for their helpful comments
and input regarding this article. However, all opinions and any errors are the author's. It
is important to also disclose that the author is counsel for plaintiffs in two civil cases
brought on behalf of former Guantanamo Bay detainees Hamad v. Gates and Ameur v.
Gates, and was plaintiffs counsel in the case of Corrie v. Caterpillar. These cases are men-
tioned in this article.
1. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (commonly referred to as the First Judici-
ary Act).
2. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 237 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[W]e
have consistently used the term 'customary international law' as a synonym for the term
the 'law of nations."); The Estrella, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 298, 307-08 (1819) (referring to the
non-treaty-based law of nations as the "the customary ... law of nations").
3. Aliens possessed the right to seek redress for violations of the law of nations in
some state courts, but Congress wanted to ensure aliens had access to federal courts
thinking they would offer a fairer tribunal for their claims, an important part of assuring
fair redress for purposes of peaceful foreign relations. See Gwynne Skinner, Federal Juris-
diction over U.S. Citizens' Claims for Violation of the Law of Nations in Light of Sosa, 37
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 53, 77-78, 84 n.163 (1988).
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law required that nations provide remedies to foreign citizens
who were wrongfully injured while under the protection of the
host nation,4 an obligation the founders took seriously.
The founders ensured the availability of such remedies by en-
acting the Alien Tort Statute5 ("ATS") in 1789, which allowed al-
iens to sue for violations of the law of nations in federal courts.s
The ATS does not specify or limit who may be a defendant in such
suits.7 Although the traditional thinking has been that Congress
enacted the ATS in response to an incident where a foreign citi-
zen was the perpetrator-the Marbois affair--Congress had U.S.
citizens equally in mind as it did foreign citizens as likely defend-
ants in these claims. Importantly, the founders understood and
intended that even U.S. officials could be defendants in such
4. At the time of the First Judiciary Act's enactment, Congress contemplated the
remedying of injuries that occurred within the host country's borders, whether by its own
citizens for by foreign citizens. See discussion infra Section I.B. Later, with the publishing
in 1795 of an opinion by Attorney General Bradford involving civil liability under the Al-
ien Tort Statute against U.S. citizens for their role in an attack on a British colony in Sier-
ra Leone, the executive branch contemplated that remedies should be provided for injuries
done by U.S. citizens, even those that took place extraterritorially. See Curtis A. Bradley,
The Alien Tort Statute and Article 111, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587 (2002) (citing Joseph Modeste
Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 455, 469-70 (1995)); discussion infra Section I.B.
5. The First Congress enacted the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") in 1789 as part of the
First Judiciary Act. The ATS reads, "The district courts shall have jurisdiction over tort
claims for violations of the law of nations and treaties." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The ATS
was enacted as Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Judiciary Act, § 9, 1 Stat. 73.
6. The First Judiciary Act provided federal courts with diversity jurisdiction over
claims where an alien was a party when the amount in controversy was over $500. Judici-
ary Act, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78-79. The $500 requirement for claims involving aliens was the
result of a compromise involving the difficulty of British debt collections under the Treaty
of Paris. WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 9 (Herbert A. Johnson ed., 1995). By
providing for federal jurisdiction over cases involving aliens only where the amount in con-
troversy exceeded $500, a large majority of such litigation would be forced to proceed in
state courts, which were much more sympathetic to U.S. citizens. Id. Thus, without the
ATS, there would have been no federal court jurisdiction generally involving aliens for
claims under $500. By enacting the ATS, Congress ensured federal court jurisdiction for
claims brought by aliens even if the amount in controversy was less than $500, as long the
suit was a tort claim for violation of the law of nations.
7. Of course, federal courts must still have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
This means that the defendant must reside in the state of the host federal court, have suf-
ficient contact with the jurisdiction to meet the constitutional requirements of personal
jurisdiction, or be served with the lawsuit while within the jurisdiction (known as "tag"
jurisdiction). See Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990); Kulko v. Superior
Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 101 (1978).
8. See discussion infra Section 1.B (discussing the Marbois affair).
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suits, thereby providing aliens with judicial remedies for actions
by U.S. officials.9 It is also important to note that by enacting the
ATS, Congress gave federal courts the power to adjudicate such
claims and provide remedies rather than reserving such powers
for itself or assigning the claims to the executive branch.
This article does not suggest that the founders' original intent
regarding remedies available to aliens for violations of interna-
tional law should prevail regardless of changed international cir-
cumstances, changes in legal theory, or other developments. In-
stead, it suggests that their desires and "original intent" are
important to understand when contemplating modern departures
from original intent, as well as to ensure that the purpose of the
ATS-a Congressional statute that is alive and well, after all-is
not frustrated.
The founders' intent that aliens have judicial remedies for such
violations is important to consider given two legal conundrums.
The first is the growth over the last thirty years of both Congres-
sional statutes and common law doctrines that limit the ability of
individuals, and in particular aliens, to obtain a remedy when
they suffer injuries caused by U.S. officials engaging in tortious
behavior, including when such behavior violates international
law and the U.S. Constitution." This development contravenes
not only the founders' desires and intentions, but the remedy-
protection policies and practices of Congress and the judiciary
throughout most of U.S. history. This commitment, and the legal
paradigm that allowed it to be met, generally continued until the
1980s. At that time, Congress enacted a statute known as the
Westfall Act of 1988 and the courts further developed common
law doctrines that created serious roadblocks to such remedies."
The Westfall Act was perhaps the most significant barrier to
remedies erected during the last thirty years because it gives the
9. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: In-
quiries Into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 19-22 (1985).
10. See Federal Employees Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-394, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006)). The Federal
Employees Reform and Tort Compensation Act ("FERTC") is known as the Westfall Act
because it was enacted to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Westfall v. Erwin, 484
U.S. 292 (1988). See, e.g., In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 110-11
(D.D.C. 2007).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006).
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United States the ability to substitute itself as the defendant in
place of U.S. officials sued in their individual capacities as long as
the United States certifies that those officials acted "within the
scope" of employment.2 Once this substitution occurs, the case
then proceeds against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act 1 ("FTCA"), the statute by which the United States-
which is otherwise entitled to sovereign immunity' 4-allows cer-
tain tort claims to be brought against it. The FTCA and its vari-
ous exclusions and exemptions, however, operate to prevent such
suits in ways that disparately impact aliens who have suffered
violations of their rights under international law. For example,
the United States has waived sovereign immunity for intentional
torts perpetrated by U.S. law enforcement or investigative per-
sonnel only, but not for intentional torts committed by other offi-
cials or employees.6 Moreover, the United States has not waived
immunity for harms arising in a foreign country,' 6 even where the
United States has control over the geographic area where the
harm arose, 7 and even if acts contributing to or causing the harm
take place in the United States;8 or for torts arising under cus-
tomary international law.19 These are only some of the limitations
12. See id.
13. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
14. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821) ("[T]he universally
received opinion is that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United
States.").
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006).
16. Id. § 2680(k) (2006).
17. See Al Janko v. Gates, 831 F. Supp. 2d 272, 282, 284 (D.D.C. 2011); Hamad v.
Gates, No. C10.591 MJP, 2011 WL 6130413, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2011); A1-Zahrani
v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 119 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Smith v. United States, 507
U.S. 197, 198-204 (1993) (finding that Antarctica was considered a foreign country for
purposes of the FTCA, even though it did not have a government, was sovereignless, and
had no tort law of its own).
18. The Supreme Court rejected this argument of FTCA cases, known as the "head-
quarters doctrine," in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. 542 U.S. 692, 702-04 (2004). The case is
better known for its affirmance that federal courts can use their common law power to rec-
ognize claims for violation of the law of nations pursuant to the jurisdictional grant of the
ATS. Id. at 712-37. Now, the foreign country exception applies to the location where the
harm or injury occurred. Id. at 703-05.
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) (describing the "law of the place" where the act oc-
curred as the law under which the United States will be held liable); see also Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950) (holding that "law of the place" meant state law).
Courts have thus far rejected arguments that international law could be considered "law
of place" under the FTCA. See Al Janko, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 283 (finding that customary
international law is not state law and thus not within the FTCA); Bansal v. Russ, 513 F.
Supp. 2d 264, 280 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307(JG), 2006 WL
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to claims that can be brought under the FTCA, but they are the
ones that particularly affect aliens who have been harmed by U.S.
officials.
Various common law doctrines developed by federal courts
have also worked to preclude remedies for individuals injured
through actions of U.S. officials, especially in combination with
the Westfall Act and the FTCA limitations. Like the statutory
changes, these developments have also had a disparate impact on
aliens, all in contravention of the founders' and earlier genera-
tions' intentions. These developments include various immunity
doctrines, such as officials' qualified immunity0 claims of viola-
tion of the U.S. Constitution known as "Bivens claims";2' the con-
sideration of "special factors counselling hesitation" in recogniz-
ing a Bivens claim; 2 the political question doctrine;28  and the
more recent "case-specific deference" in cases potentially impact-
ing foreign relations. 4
These relatively recent roadblocks to remedies for aliens must
also be viewed in context of the second legal conundrum: the dou-
ble-standard which exists where, although federal courts typically
hold foreign officials liable for torts in violation of customary in-
ternational law in cases typically brought under the ATS or the
1662663, at *50 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006), rev'd on other grounds, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir.
2009).
20. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434
U.S. 555, 565 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)) ("[G]overnment offi-
cials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.').
21. Torts in violation of the U.S. Constitution are referred to as Bivens claims, given
that the Supreme Court recognized such claims as a matter of federal common law in
Bivens u. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971).
22. The term comes from Bivens, in which the Supreme Court explained that a claim
in that case "involve[d] no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirma-
tive action by Congress." 403 U.S. at 396; see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574-75
(2d Cir. 2009); Rasul v. Myers (Rasul 11), 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
23. The political question doctrine traces its roots to the early case of Marbury v. Mad-
ison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("[Q]uestions, in their nature political, or which
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court."). The modern political question doctrine was set forth in the 1962 case of Baker v.
Carr. 369 U.S. 186, 210-11, 217 (1962).
24. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
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Torture Victims Protection Act2" ("TVPA"), U.S. officials are typi-
cally immune from such acts. This has resulted primarily from
the different tests applied to U.S. officials and foreign officials in
determining whether the official was acting "within the scope" of
employment or authority when engaging in tortious actions." In
addition, courts' application of the political question doctrine typ-
ically results in claims against U.S. officials for violations of cus-
tomary international law or other torts (if the case has not other-
wise been dismissed on other grounds) as being nonjusticiable,
whereas the doctrine has typically not precluded claims against
foreign officials.27
Even the ability of aliens to hold U.S. corporations accountable
for their roles in violations of customary international law--one
area where aliens have had some, albeit limited, success--is now
at issue. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Supreme
Court is currently considering whether corporations can even be
held liable for such violations under the ATS.29 Any decision limit-
ing liability of corporations would be a further roadblock to an al-
ien seeking a remedy against U.S. citizens or actors who violate
international law.
These two developments-the rise and expansion of legislation
and common law doctrines precluding claims against U.S. offi-
cials for violations of both customary international law and the
U.S. Constitution, and the differing standards of immunity and
liability for U.S. and foreign officials-have greatly contravened
the founders' intention that aliens have the ability to seek a rem-
edy for serious harms caused by U.S. citizens, including U.S. offi-
25. Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). Such torts typically include torture, cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment ("CIDT"), extrajudicial killing, and prolonged arbitrary deten-
tion.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006); see Elizabeth A. Wilson, Is Torture All in a Day's Work?
Scope of Employment, The Absolute Immunity Doctrine, and Human Rights Litigation
Against U.S. Federal Officials, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POLY 175, 190-96 (2008).
27. See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010); Hilao v. Mar-
cos (In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
28. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
29. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted,
__ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). Given that this article is primarily discussing the lia-
bility of U.S. officials for their violations, a decision in Kiobel finding that corporations can
be liable for their role in violations of customary international law should not affect the
premise or ideas contained in this article.
[Vol. 47:555
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cials, and have resulted in legal hypocrisy, which itself could have
potential foreign policy implications.
Finally, it is important to explore the implications of these de-
velopments and the questions they raise. First, are the founders'
intentions regarding the provision of remedies to aliens as appli-
cable and relevant today, given that the United States is now a
super power against whom other countries will likely not declare
war simply for failing to provide a remedy for tort violations? Se-
cond, are there changes that Congress should make to ensure the
realization of the founders' and earlier generations' desire that al-
iens have access to a remedies for tort violations, and if so, what
should they be? Third, under what circumstances should courts
interpret statutes and apply common law doctrines with the
founders' intent in mind, and what canon of statutory interpreta-
tion should they use? These questions are explored toward the
end of this article.
Section I of the article reviews the United States' early history,
concluding that the founders' desire to ensure aliens had a reme-
dy for torts in violation of customary international law included
when such torts were perpetrated by U.S. citizens, including U.S.
officials. As others have noted, the provision of this remedy in
large part reflected a desire that the young country comply with
international law and avoid diplomatic and foreign entangle-
ments." This is especially true given that 200 years ago, failing to
provide a remedy for international law violations could lead to
war or other diplomatic problems. Section I further describes that
throughout the 1800s, courts routinely found that U.S. officials
could be held liable for customary international law and constitu-
tional violations, including for claims brought by aliens, a trend
that continued well into the last century. Although scholars have
largely overlooked this history, ensuring a remedy to aliens for
tortious actions by U.S. citizens and officials was important to
earlier generations not only for foreign policy reasons, but also
because it was the right thing to do.
Section II briefly discusses the obligation under international
law for countries to provide remedies to aliens whose rights are
30. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Theoretical and Historical
Foundations of the Alien Tort Claims Act and Its Discontents: A Reality check, 16 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 585, 587-88 (2004).
20131
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violated under international law-law that existed both at the
time of the country's founding and continues today.
Section III traces the development of official immunity, statu-
tory enactments, and various common law doctrines that have re-
sulted in barriers to aliens obtaining remedies for violations of
their rights under customary international law and the U.S. Con-
stitution, especially when perpetrated by U.S. officials. Certainly,
such barriers often also affect U.S. citizens' ability to seek reme-
dies. Section III, however, explains in detail how the combination
of the various statutes and common law doctrines results in a
complex web of barriers that restrains aliens' ability to seek rem-
edies for harm caused by U.S. officials' tortious and illegal ac-
tions more than U.S. citizens' ability to seek remedies. The article
also discusses whether courts are applying the various statutes
and doctrines appropriately. In addition, Section III discusses
how the differences in courts' applications of statutory and com-
mon law to tort claims for violation of customary international
law against foreign officials results in a hypocritical and contra-
dictory remedial paradigm between U.S. and foreign officials, and
one that potentially has negative consequences for U.S. foreign
policy.
Section IV acknowledges that the United States' role and sta-
tus in the world is different today than they were at the country's
founding. This section explores whether the United States' com-
pliance with international law-including ensuring a remedy
when its officials commit torts against aliens in violation of cus-
tomary international law and the U.S. Constitution-is as im-
portant today as it was at time of the country's founding. The sec-
tion concludes that although it may not be as salient of an issue
for national security as it was at the time of the founding, comply-
ing with international law is still a critical part of U.S. foreign
policy, noting various recent official pronouncements regarding
the importance of international law and the United States' com-
pliance with it.
Section V contains conclusory observations and proposes vari-
ous changes to the Westfall Act and the FTCA. It also suggests a
rule for courts in their interpretation of these statutes and in
their application of common law doctrines that will allow for bet-
ter compliance with the founders' original intent, with Congres-
sional intent in enacting the FTCA and Westfall Act, and with
[Vol. 47:555
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current international law obligations, which require access to ju-
dicial remedies for aliens who suffer harm from torts in violation
of their rights under customary international law.
I. THE FOUNDERS WANTED TO ENSURE ALIENS HAD ACCESS
TO CIVIL REMEDIES FOR TORTS IN VIOLATION OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS PERPETRATED BY U.S. CITIZENS, INCLUDING
U.S. OFFICIALS
A. The Founders Wanted to Ensure that Aliens Who Suffered
Harm Through International Law Violations Were Provided a
Remedy
There is little debate that the founders of the United States
sought to ensure that the young country would comply with the
law of nations. 31 It is not an exaggeration to say that this was a
critical concern of theirs, and they knew it was crucial to being
recognized as a legitimate sovereign by other nations and to avoid
armed conflict.2 This desired compliance with international law
included addressing and remedying violations of the law of na-
tions," something the Continental Congress, which preceded the
Constitutional Convention, had been unable to do.t
31. See, e.g., CASTO, supra note 6, at 45; Bradley, supra note 4, at 587; Anne-Marie
Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 461, 472 (1989); William Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over
Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 490 (1986); An-
thony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J.
INT'L L. 62, 63 (1988); William Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 705-08 (2002); David M. Golove
& Daniel Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of
Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 932 (2010);
Julian G. Ku, Customary International Law in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 265, 271-72
(2001); Randall, supra note 9, at 11-12; Steinhardt, supra note 30, at 585.
32. See also Casto, supra note 31, at 490 (citing 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 1137 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1914)).
33. Id.; see also Bradley, supra note 4, at 630, 642.
34. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 642-43 (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19, 25 (Max Farrand ed. 1911)). In his opening remarks to the
Federal Convention, Edmund Randolph observed that one of the defects of the Articles of
Confederation was that the national government "could not cause infractions of treaties or
of the law of nations, to be punished," and that "[i]f the rights of an ambassador be invad-
ed by any citizen it is only in a few States that any laws exist to punish the offender." Id.
In a subsequent letter, Randolph noted that in "the constitutions, and laws of the several
states ... the law of nations is unprovided with sanctions in many cases, which deeply af-
2013]
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There were several ways in which the young country sought to
signal that it was committed to the law of nations and that it
would hold violators accountable. One was giving Congress the
power to define and prosecute crimes for violations of the law of
nations. 5 However, it was not only important to the founders to
hold violators accountable criminally, but also to ensure that
those injured by violations of the law of nations, particularly al-
iens, were provided a civil remedy, and in particular, the ability
to bring a damages claim in federal court.36
The effort to provide a civil judicial remedy began at least as
early as 1781,17 and was ultimately accomplished by the First
Congress' enactment of the ATS3" in 1789 as part of the First Ju-
fect public dignity and public justice." Id. (quoting A Letter of His Excellency Edmund
Randolph, Esq., on the Federal Constitution (Oct. 10, 1787), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 262, 263 (John P. Kaminski & Gas-
pare J. Saladino eds., 1988)). Randolph further observed that the Continental Congress
did not have the express authority "to remedy these defects," and that, as a result, the con-
federacy might be "doomed to be plunged into war, from its wretched impotency to check
offenses against this law." Id. James Madison remarked at the Federal Convention that,
under the Articles of Confederation, the country was unable to "prevent those violations of
the law of nations & of Treaties which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of
foreign wars." Id. (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra,
at 316). In the Federalist Papers, Madison stated that the Articles of Confederation were
deficient because they "contain no provision for the cases of offenses against the law of na-
tions; and consequently leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Con-
federacy with foreign nations." Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 330-31 (James
Madison)). It should be noted, however, that Professor Bradley takes these comments to
only refer to criminal accountability, and not for evidence of providing a cause of action.
Id. at 642,
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (conferring upon Congress the power "[t]o define and
punish... Offences against the Law of Nations").
36. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Re-
sponse to the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 224 (1996) (finding
that the ATS "was designed to ensure that those who violated the law of nations could be
held liable not just criminally but civilly as well"); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 715 (2004) (describing that the founders found it critical to ensure that the fed-
eral courts have jurisdiction over aliens' claims for torts in violation of the law of nations
because they were the type of violations that potentially "threatened serious consequences
in international affairs"); Casto, supra note 31, at 481 (noting that scholar William Black-
stone, the Continental Congress, and the courts all indicated that "a judicial remedy was
necessary in order to assuage the anger of foreign sovereigns"); id. at 491 (explaining the
reasoning behind granting a civil remedy).
37. See e.g., Dodge, supra note 31, at 692 ("Research has shown that the Alien Tort
Statute was the culmination of an effort dating back to at least 1781 to ensure individual
tort liability for violations of the law of nations, an effort that was made more urgent by
the famous Marbois Affair of 1784.").
38. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). The First Judiciary Act originally read, "[the district courts] shall
[Vol. 47:555
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diciary Act.3 The ATS gives federal courts jurisdiction over tort
claims brought by aliens for violations of the law of nations, a
term now seen as synonymous with customary international
law.4"
According to several scholars, allowing aliens to bring tort
claims for violations of the law of nations in federal court, as pro-
vided through the ATS, was a direct response to the founders' be-
lief that it was the United States' responsibility under interna-
tional law to remedy injuries to aliens when their international
rights were violated and to do so in order to avoid foreign affairs
consequences.4' In developing the accountability and civil remedi-
al scheme for violations of the law of nations, the founders also
relied on influential international law commentators such as
Emmerich de Vattel, perhaps the most famous international
scholar at the time,42 and William Blackstone, a well-known and
respected English legal scholar. 3 Vattel wrote in his influential
international law treatise in 1758 that "[a] sovereign who refuses
to repair the evil done by one of his subjects, or to punish the
criminal, or, finally, to deliver him up, makes himself in a way an
accessory to the deed, and becomes responsible for it."" He also
specifically referred to the "denial of justice" for aliens as a justi-
fication for wars of reprisal launched by the alien's country. 5
also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit
courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., The Estrella, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 298, 307-08 (1819) (referring to non-
treaty-based law of nations as the "the customary and conventional law of nations'); Flo-
res v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 237 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003).
41. See Randall, supra note 31, at 20-21; see also John M. Rogers, The Alien Tort
Statute and How Individuals "Violate" International Law, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 47,
47 (1988) (arguing that the First Congress intended to limit the Alien Tort Statute to tor-
tious acts "which, if unaddressed, would result in international legal responsibility on the
part of the United States"); Slaughter, supra note 31, at 464 (noting that the ATS "was a
straightforward response to what the framers understood to be their duty under the law of
nations").
42. D'Amato, supra note 31, at 64.
43. Bradley, supra note 4, at 630-31.
44. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
bk. III, § 77, 137 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758).
45. DAmato, supra note 31, at 64 (citing VATTEL, supra note 44, bk. II, § 350, 230-31).
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William Blackstone, who profoundly affected America's found-
ing generation,46 made similar pronouncements. For example, in
discussing violations of the law of nations, Blackstone noted that
a sovereign should ensure that injured "stranger[s]" receive resti-
tution from those individuals who harmed them through viola-
tions of international law.47
Providing aliens with the ability to seek a remedy in federal
court was especially important because under the Articles of Con-
federation, many states had failed to provide such remedies even
though Congress had repeatedly requested them to enact legisla-
tion to do so, much to Congress' consternation.48 For example, in
1781, the Continental Congress passed a resolution calling upon
states to enact legislation providing for the vindication of rights
under the law of nations because it felt "hamstrung" by its inabil-
ity to "cause infractions of treaties, or of the law of nations to be
punished."49 The 1781 resolution not only addressed criminal pun-
ishment for violations of the law of nations, it included a recom-
mendation that the states "authorise suits to be instituted for
damages by the party injured, and for compensation to the United
States for damage sustained by them from an injury done to a
foreign power by a citizen." The committee report attached to
the 1781 resolution explains that the last part of this sentence re-
ferred to the fact that if damages were found to be an appropriate
remedy, they should be paid by the perpetrator rather than by
the United States.51
Although the legislative history of the ATS is notably sparse,"
many scholars have documented that the drafters of the ATS
46. See Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A
Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 731 (1976).
47. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69-70 (noting that with violations of safe
conduct "the injured stranger should have restitution out of [the violator's] effects . , .
[and] the lord chancellor... may cause full restitution and amends to be made to the par-
ty injured").
48. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 147 n.49 (2d Cir. 2010);
see also Ku, supra note 31, at 272-73.
49. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716 (2004) (citing JAMES MADISON,
JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 60 (E. Scott ed. 1893); 21 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 1136-37).
50. Casto, supra note 31, at 491 (quoting 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 1137).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718-19.
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wanted to ensure compliance with the law of nations, given the
states' failures to do so. 3 Regardless of the exact reasons for the
statute's enactment, there was national consensus that the feder-
al courts should be open to any alien who had suffered tortious in-
juries in violation of international law, and that the national in-
terest in doing so was so obvious that Congress used broad, open-
ended language to vest the federal courts with complete power
over these kinds of cases.54
B. Congress Intended that a Remedy Be Available for Violations
by U.S. Citizens, Including U.S. Officials
The commitment to provide a remedy to aliens for torts in vio-
lation of international law included ensuring restitution for inju-
ries when aliens' rights were violated by U.S. citizens. With re-
gard to the ATS, the statute does not specify who can be a
defendant, and it is unclear what sort of defendants Congress had
in mind when enacting the statute. 5 Many scholars have sug-
gested that an incident known as the Marbois affair-where the
defendant was an alien-likely precipitated the drafting and pas-
sage of ATS, 56 although noting that there had been earlier well-
publicized incidents of criminal and tortious offenses against am-
bassadors and other foreign dignitaries which had occurred in the
United States. 7 The Marbois affair involved an assault on a
French diplomat by French adventurer De Longchamps on the
streets of Philadelphia in 1784.58 The international community
was "outraged" and demanded that the Continental Congress
take action, but Congress lacked the authority to do anything un-
53. See, e.g., id. at 716-18 (citing Randall, supra note 31, at 15-21); CASTO, supra note
6, at 43-44.
54. See CASTO, supra note 6, at 43-44 (analogizing the national consensus for the ATS
with the national consensus for federal admiralty courts).
55. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718-19 (describing the lack of consensus regarding congressional
intent when enacting the ATS).
56. Scholars have linked the Marbois affair to the drafting of the ATS. See CASTO, su-
pra note 6, at 7-8; Casto, supra note 31, at 491-94; Dodge, supra note 31, at 692, 695;
Randall, supra note 31, at 24-27.
57. See Edwin Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the Unit-
ed States-Part 1, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 30-32 (1952); Randall, supra note 31, at 24, (citing
1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 457-65 (1953)).
58. See, e.g., CASTO, supra note 6, at 7-8; Dodge, supra note 31, at 694; Randall, supra
note 31, at 24.
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der the Articles of Confederation. 9 Although De Longchamps was
successfully prosecuted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,'
the event demonstrated the Continental Congress' inability to
remedy violations of the law of nations.6'
Although it is possible that Congress had the Marbois affair in
mind when drafting the ATS, there is no direct evidence that was
the case.62 In any event, virtually all of the other incidents likely
contributing to the enactment of the ATS were violations perpe-
trated by U.S. citizens, suggesting, along with the 1781 Resolu-
tion discussed above, that in fact Congress likely had U.S. citi-
zens and officials in mind when drafting the ATS. One of these
incidents was the arrest of the Dutch Ambassador's coachman by
a New York State court officer in 1787.64 The ambassador wanted
the officer prosecuted for violating diplomatic immunity, even
though Congress had determined by statute that a servant in the
coachman's position did not qualify for diplomatic immunity.6
However, the arrest was a still a violation of the law of nations,6
and the Dutch Ambassador protested, wanting accountability. 7
There is evidence that the drafters of the ATS also had in mind
the continuing problem of American citizens' mounting private
military expeditions against Spanish territories in Florida, as
well as American citizens' attacks against aliens who, under U.S.
59. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716-17; CASTO, supra note 6, at 7-8; Randall, supra
note 31, at 24.
60. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 117-18 (Phila. 0. & T. 1784).
61. After the Marbois incident, Congress called again for states to enact legislation
addressing international law violations, and this concern over the inadequate vindication
of the law of nations continued through the time of the Constitutional Convention. Sosa,
542 U.S. at 717 (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
34, at 24-25).
62. See Randall, supra note 31, at 26.
63. See id. at 20-21 (stating their injuries to aliens may occur at the hands of the
state).
64. Ku, supra note 31, at 281-82 (citing JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 310-
11 (Paul A. Freund ed. 1971)); see also Casto, supra note 31, at 494.
65. Ku, supra note 31, at 282 (citing 1 GOEBEL, supra note 64; Act of April 30, 1790,
ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112, 117-18).
66. Id. (citing VATTEL, supra note 44, bk. III, § 120, 396).
67. See Letter from P.J. Van Berkel to John Jay (Dec. 18, 1787), in 3 THE DIPLOMATIC
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FROM THE SIGNING OF THE
DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PEACE, 10TH SEPTEMBER, 1783, TO THE ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, MARCH 4, 1790, at 443 (Blair & Rives, 1837).
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treaties, were entitled to the free exercise of religion and to safe
passage through the country." It is also possible that the drafters
had in mind U.S. privateers in prize cases where the privateers
may have caused damage to the other party (or the ship's inhab-
itants) in violation of the several treaties the United States had
entered into before passage of the ATS. 5
In addition, the first Attorney General opinion regarding the
ATS concerned acts of an American who led a French fleet in at-
tacking and plundering a British slave colony in Sierra Leone.'0
Attorney General William Bradford issued an opinion in 1795
making it clear that although the United States did not have
criminal jurisdiction over the matter-which he acknowledged
was a violation of the law of nations-the ATS provided federal
jurisdiction for a civil remedy against Americans who had taken
part in the acts.7' Another attorney general made similar assump-
tions.72 One of the primary drafters of the First Judiciary Act,
Justice William Paterson, when explaining in a draft opinion that
the law of nations would provide the rules of decision for domestic
remedies of such violations, used an example of a U.S. citizen en-
listing in the British Army to fight the French in violation of the
United States' position of neutrality (and thus also in violation of
the law of nations)." These latter two examples also demonstrate
that the founders were not only concerned with remedying viola-
tions that occurred within the United States, but also with any
68. CASTO, supra note 6, at 43-44.
69. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 616-17 (citing Sweeney, supra note 4, at 469-70).
Bradley, however, does not believe these cases were a reason for the ATS, given the admi-
ralty grant of jurisdiction. Id. at 617. For a list of the treaties, see id. at 616 n.130 (cita-
tions omitted).
70. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795); see also Casto, supra note 31,
at 502-03.
71. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. at 58-59 ("But there can be no doubt that
the company or individuals who have been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy
by a civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these
courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or
a treaty of the United States"); see also Curtis Bradley, Attorney General Bradford's Opin-
ion and the Alien Tort Statute, 106 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 509, 510, 521 (2012) (noting that
original documents associated with the opinion demonstrate that Attorney General Brad-
ford contemplated that the ATS would apply extraterritorially with regard to U.S. citi-
zens).
72. See Abduction & Restitution of Slaves, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 29, 29-30 (1783) (stating
that Georgia should institute a civil process with the approbation of the slave owners in a
case in which a U.S. citizen carried away slaves from Martinque).
73. See Casto, supra note 31, at 480.
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violation perpetrated against an alien by a U.S. citizen, even if
occurring abroad.74
Furthermore, the 1781 Resolution discussed above specifically
stated that aliens would have the ability to receive compensation
for violations of their rights protected by international law when
perpetrated "by a citizen."5 In fact, Professor Curtis Bradley, cit-
ing a handwritten version of the resolution, has suggested that
the phrase "authorise suits to be instituted for damages by the
party injured" was meant to apply only to U.S. citizen perpetra-
tors.76 In addition, Emmerich de Vattel's commentary noted that a
sovereign needed to ensure a remedy for an "evil done by one of
his subjects."7 Similarly, President George Washington stated in
an address to Congress that "aggressions by our citizens on the
territory of other nations" were violations of the law of nations.
7B
Each of these suggests that the founders likely had violations by
their own citizens in mind when contemplating possible civil
remedies such as the ATS.
Professor Bradley argues that Congress meant the ATS to ap-
ply only to those cases in which at least one defendant was a U.S.
citizen7 19 given that Article III of the Constitution only provides
the federal courts with jurisdiction over claims between aliens
and citizens."0 Professor Bradley argues that the ATS is unconsti-
tutional when the defendant is not a U.S. citizen, given Article
III's language.8 ' In fact, between 1800 and 1810, the Supreme
Court repeatedly found that Article III's alienage provision only
provided for jurisdiction over claims between an alien and a citi-
74. See id. at 483-84 (noting that the founders had not only violations within the
United States on their minds, they also likely had transgressions by U.S. citizens abroad
in their sights as well); see also Bradley, supra note 71, at 521.
75. See Dodge, supra note 31, at 692-93 (footnotes omitted).
76. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 632-33. But see Dodge, supra note 31, at 692-93 &
n.31 (suggesting that Bradley's interpretation is incorrect and a suit is not limited to those
"by a citizen").
77. VATTEL, supra note 44, bk. III, § 77, 137.
78. George Washington, Fourth Annual Address, in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 125, 128 (James D. Richardson ed., 1911).
79. Bradley, supra note 4, at 591 (emphasis added).
80. Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that federal judicial power
shall extend to nine different categories, including "between a State, or the Citizens there-
of, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
81. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 591.
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zen, and not between two aliens.82 Professor Bradley argues that
this makes sense given that at the time the ATS was enacted, na-
tions were responsible under the law of nations to punish and
compensate offenses committed by their citizens."
After the founding period and throughout the 1800s and into
the 1900s, the U.S. Supreme Court issued several decisions
demonstrating the importance, in its view, of the "strictest fideli-
ty" of the United States to its duties under international law,
cognizant that not doing so would negatively impact the United
States' foreign relations.84 Most were prize cases, piracy cases, or
cases involving the rights of belligerents and the obligations of
neutrals." Of these, many involved United States citizens as
principal perpetrators or aiders and abettors"6 and, in one case, a
U.S. customs official who unlawfully seized a French ship in
Spanish waters.8 "
Furthermore, U.S. military officials were held liable for their
violations of the law of nations. Although not brought pursuant to
the ATS, but instead through admiralty jurisdiction, cases during
the early 1800s involving violations of the law of neutrality
through the wrongful capture of ships establish that federal
courts held U.S. military officials civilly liable for their acts which
82. See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809); Montalet v. Mur-
ray, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46, 47 (1807); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 13 (1800).
Although the Supreme Court has not definitively found that the ATS is constitutional un-
der Article I1, the Court has appeared to rely on Section 2's provision that federal judicial
power shall extend "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States," assuming that the law of nations is 'law of the United States."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2: see Gwynne Skinner, When Customary International Law Viola-
tions Arise Under the Law of the United States, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 205, 233-34 (2010).
It is worth noting that the court in the seminal ATS case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, found
the ATS to be constitutional based on the 'laws of the United States" provision of Article
III. 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court allowed this to stand in Sosa V.
Alvarez-Machain, where the defendants included Mexican citizens. 542 U.S. 692, 698,
724-25, 731-32 (2004).
83. Bradley, supra note 4, at 630.
84. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 25, 565
(Little, Brown, & Co. 1922) (footnote omitted).
85. See id.
86. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 637-38 (1862); Jecker v. Montgomery, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 110, 112 (1855); The Joseph, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 451, 454 (1814); The Rapid,
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 159 (1814); see also 2 WARREN, supra note 84, at 40-46.
87. 2 WARREN, supra note 84, at 41-42 (citing The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362
(1824)).
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violated international law.8 These cases include the 1804 com-
panion cases of Murray v. Charming Betsy"8 and Little v.
Barreme.9' In both cases, U.S. naval officers were held liable for
civil damages in cases brought by Danish citizens (the ships'
owners) for violating neutrality laws.9' Holding the officers liable
and providing compensation to the ships' owners was seen as im-
portant in maintaining diplomatic relations with the Nether-
lands.92 Holding true to the founders' desires, United States fed-
eral courts during this time continued to ensure that aliens who
had their rights under international law violated by U.S. citizens,
including military officers, 93 were provided a remedy.94
C. Throughout Most of U.S. History, Immunity Did Not Prevent
Suits for Injuries Caused by U.S. Officials
Throughout the founding period and until the mid-1900s, it
was assumed that individuals, including foreigners, could receive
remedies for injuries caused by U.S. officials' misconduct and tor-
tious behavior, either from the officials themselves or from Con-
gress.95 As stated in 1797,
If a foreigner is injured by a general or special act of a state, and the
law of nations; or establishing treaty with his nation, or sovereign, is
88. See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: In-
demnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1862, 1863, 1877-82 (2010).
89. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
90. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
91. However, with regard to both cases, Congress ultimately indemnified the defend-
ants, as was the practice during that period of time. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 88, at
1866.
92. Id.
93. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 88, at 1897.
94. See also 1 WARREN, supra note 84, at 582 (quoting The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
362, 367 (1824)) ("[Ihe Court can only look to the questions, whether the laws have been
violated; and if they were, justice demands that the injured party should receive a suitable
redress.").
95. Donald L. Doernberg, Taking Supremacy Seriously: The Contrariety of Official
Immunities, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 443, 443, 463 (2011) (providing a historical background
of official and sovereign immunity, questioning current federal court precedent regarding
official immunities in light of constitutional supremacy, arguing that many of the official
immunities that currently exist are unsupportable under the Constitution).
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violated by the special or general act of a state, he has his remedy in
the Court of the United States, against the person, from whose im-
mediate doings the injuries arises.
In the late 1700s and early 1800s, U.S. officials were not im-
mune from being sued individually for their acts which violated
the law, even when they were acting within the scope of their du-
ties;9 rather, as the cases discussed in the prior section demon-
strate, they were typically held liable for paying civil damages if
the courts found they had violated the law, regardless of whether
they had intended to or not." If found liable, the official was often
indemnified through private bills enacted by Congress.99 In those
situations Congress would determine whether the official should
be indemnified, and Congress typically would do so if it deter-
mined that the official was acting as an "honest agent" within his
authority.00 Indemnification almost became a legislative right,'01
and in the mid-1800s the federal courts also came to adopt this
view, finding that officials acting under instruction were entitled
to indemnification.
1 0 2
It is important to note that during this time, even where the
act of an official was authorized and, thus, seen as an act of the
United States, sovereign immunity (by which the United States
itself could not be sued)03 did not operate to prevent an injured
96. A True Federalist, Independent Chronicle, Mar. 2 & 6, 1797, reprinted in 5 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 629, 630 (Maeva
Marcus ed., 1994).
97. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 88, at 1868, 1871 (providing a detailed history and
analysis of the development of official and sovereign immunity in the early period of the
United States, contrasting it with today's conception of both sovereign and official immun-
ity).
98. Id. at 1882-83; see also Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804); Mur-
ray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 112 (1804).
99. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 88, at 1876, 1904, 1918-19; see, e.g., Act for the Relief
of Richard Kidd and Benjamin Kidd, ch. 185, 9 Stat. 677 (1846); Act for the Relief of Paolo
Paoly, ch. 27, 6 Stat. 47 (1802).
100. Doernberg, supra note 95, at 464 (footnotes omitted); see also Pfander & Hunt,
supra note 88, at 1868.
101. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 88, at 1911-12.
102. Id.; see also Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 263 (1845) (McLean, J., dissent-
ing) (finding that when an official incurs liability while acting under instructions, the gov-
ernment is bound to indemnify the official); Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 98-
99 (1836) (indicating that indemnity of federal officials was a matter of right).
103. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821) ("[T]he universally
received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United
States.").
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party from being compensated.1 4 Rather, as just described, the
claim could be brought against the official, and then Congress
would determine whether to indemnify the official.0 5 Alternative-
ly, the injured party could seek a remedy directly from Congress,
which, in turn, would decide what the remedy would be."6
In the mid-1800s, this regime for compensating those injured
by U.S. officials' conduct began to change, but in such a way that
still allowed parties to be compensated for their injuries. First,
beginning around 1845, the Supreme Court began developing
common law immunity doctrines for officials based on the notion
of sovereign immunity,"7 finding that officials could only be sued
where they acted outside of authority or with malice or cruelty,
and not where their acts were simply based on an error in judg-
ment."' In the 1896 case of Spalding v. Vilas the Supreme Court
extended absolute immunity, which had previously been applied
to legislators, to cabinet-level executive officers, and to heads of
104. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 88, at 1868, 1876.
105. Id.
106. See generally Floyd Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States:
The Evolution From a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV,
625, 627, 653, 664 (1985) (discussing the "legislative model" of claims adjudication). Alt-
hough the issue of sovereign immunity of the United States is complicated, the Supreme
Court in Cohens v. Virginia acknowledged in dicta that it was unable to determine claims
against the United States in court, stating that "the universally received opinion is that no
suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States." 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at
411-12. After the Civil War the courts affirmed the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204-08 (1882); Briggs v. Light-Boat, 93 Mass. (11 Al-
len) 157, 166-77 (1865). The Supreme Court first applied the concept of sovereign immuni-
ty in United States v. McLemore, but without explanation or analysis. 45 U.S. (4 How.)
286, 287-88 (1846). The doctrine of sovereign immunity was criticized from the founding
throughout the 1800s, but it was particularly challenged after World War I. See Shimomu-
ra, supra, at 678-82. Congress continued to waive its immunity and allowed itself to be
sued in a variety of instances, culminating in waiver of immunity for certain torts in the
Federal Tort Claim Act of 1946. Id.; see Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat.
842 (1947) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 (1983)). In the 1962 case of
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, the Supreme Court found it had Article III jurisdiction over claims
against the United States as long as Congress waived sovereign immunity over such
claims. 370 U.S. 530, 572 (1962).
107. Doernberg, supra note 95, at 443 (noting that official immunity is derived from
sovereign immunity).
108. See id. at 457-58 (citing Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89 (1849); Kendall v.
Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845)). As Professor Doernberg points out, the court in Ken-
dall v. Stokes relied on an English case, Gidley v. Palmerston, which held that although an
official doing work on the government's behalf should not be sued, the crown would still
provide "ample justice" to a plaintiff if his demands were well-founded. (1822) 129 Eng.
Rep. 1290, 1294-95 (C.P.).
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executive departments under certain conditions."9 After Spal-
ding, a high-level executive received immunity even if he acted
out of a personal or malicious motive, as long as he acted "within
his authority," a concept referred to as absolute immunity.110
However, importantly, Congress continued to allow individuals to
petition it directly for compensation where the harm was caused
by an official who was authorized to act as he did and was thus
entitled to immunity."'
Second, as claims against the United States increased,"2 an
overwhelmed Congress, which was not doing a very good job
providing timely or sufficient remedies, struggled to provide ave-
nues for prompt and adequate compensation."' Congress first ad-
dressed the problem by creating a Committee on Claims,"4 which
morphed in 1855 into the Court of Claims,'11 although its jurisdic-
tion was mostly over contracts. 16
D. United States Begins Waiving Sovereign Immunity
The problem of adequate and timely remedies for official mis-
conduct came to a head in the 1870s in the wake of a large in-
crease in claims arising from both the expansion of federal power
and the Civil War."' At the urging of President Lincoln, who not-
ed it was the duty of the government to render "prompt justice,""'
Congress began to waive sovereign immunity for some claims by
increasingly allowing both the Court of Claims and the federal
district courts to adjudicate claims against the United States for
109. 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896); Wilson, supra note 26, at 207.
110. 161 U.S. at 498-99; Wilson, supra note 26, at 207 (footnote omitted).
111. See generally, Shimomura, supra note 106, at 650-52 (discussing the creation of
the Court of Claims).
112. Id. at 648 (citing H.R. REP. No. 730, at 4 (2d sess. 1838)).
113. See id. at 649-52.
114. Id. at 644 (citing 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 883 (1849)).
115. Id. at 652 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 33D CONG., 2D SESS. 105-06 (1855)).
116. Id. at 655 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 304 (1863)). In addition to
limiting the Court of Claim's jurisdiction, Congress initially treated the Court of Claims'
decisions as advisory, which hampered the new court and resulted in most claims, includ-
ing tort claims, still having to proceed before Congress. Id. at 652-53 (citing CONG. GLOBE,
34TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1245 (1856)).
117. Id. at 398.
118. CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 2D SEss. app. 2 (1861).
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official and authorized acts of its employees."9 These waivers in-
cluded the Tucker Act of 1887,"' which waived sovereign immuni-
ty for claims involving contracts, admiralty, takings, and tax re-
funds, among others, but not for tort claims.' Pursuant to the
Tucker Act, individuals could seek a remedy for violations of the
law of nations in the area of prize directly from the United States
for acts of its military officials (as opposed to only against officials
themselves). For example, in the 1913 case of MacLeod v. United
States, the U.S. Supreme Court, reversing a Court of Claims deci-
sion, held that a citizen of Great Britain was allowed a remedy
from the United States when U.S. military officials unlawfully
seized duties from him during U.S. occupation of the Philip-
pines."2
Congress retained jurisdiction to consider other tort claims
against the United States."3 However, those harmed could still
sue individual officials in court, and courts would not grant the
officers any sort of immunity if they were acting either outside of
authority or with malice.2 4 For example, in the well-known 1900
case of The Paquete Habana, typically cited for its proposition
that "[i]nternational law is part of our law,""' the Court found
that the Cuban owners of civilian fishing boats (sailing under the
flag of Spain) were entitled to restitution and damages from the
defendant U.S. admiral after the Court found that the defend-
ant's actions were illegal under the law of nations. 26
With regard to the limited availability of court claims against
the United States, especially for torts, the criticism of sovereign
immunity, which had been occurring since the country's founding,
intensified after World War I and throughout the 1920s and
119. See Shimomura, supra note 106, at 653.
120. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(2006 & Supp. V 2011)). The Tucker Act gave jurisdiction to the Court of Claims for claims
(excluding tort) over $10,000, and concurrent jurisdiction to the Court of Claims and fed-
eral district courts for claims under $10,000. Id. at 505.
121. Shimomura, supra note 106, at 664 (citing 18 CONG. REc. 2166, 2175-76 (1887)).
122. 229 U.S. 416, 432, 435 (1913).
123. Shimomura, supra note 106, at 664 (citing Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505, 505
(1887)).
124. See, e.g., The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
125. Id. at 700.
126. Id. at 714.
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1930s.127 This, along with the increasing number of tort claims in
private bills before Congress,"' led to calls for abolishing sover-
eign immunity for torts and the transfer of jurisdiction to hear
such cases to the federal courts.2 9 Just like Lincoln had done,
President Roosevelt urged Congress in 1942 to relieve itself of the
duty to consider claims against it-now mostly tort claims-by
waiving sovereign immunity and allowing federal courts to con-
sider tort claims against the United States. 30
E. Enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946
As part of a reorganization in 1946,' Congress enacted the
FTCA,132 waiving sovereign immunity for most torts, and in par-
ticular, for damages to property or injury to persons caused by
the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Gov-
ernment while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, in jury, or
death, in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omis-
sion occurred.' 3
Congress did not waive immunity for certain intentional acts,
such as assault, false arrest or imprisonment, or for discretionary
acts.' The FTCA also lists other acts for which the United States
127. Shimomura, supra note 106, at 679-80.
128. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950).
129. Id. at 140; Shimomura, supra note 106, at 679.
130. Shimomura, supra note 106, at 682-83.
131. Id. at 683-84.
132. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1947) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)). Importantly, Congress also banned the intro-
duction of private bills to Congress for those claims which could be brought under the
FTCA, thus making the FTCA remedy exclusive for those torts for which Congress waived
immunity. Shimomura, supra note 106, at 684 (citing Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812, 831).
133. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. at 843.
134. The FTCA expressly excluded "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrep-
resentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." Id. at 846. The Act also excluded
"[any claim ... based upon the exercise ... or the failure to exercise... a discretionary
function.., whether or not the discretion involved be abused." Id. at 845. As discussed
infra, Congress amended this part of the FTCA in 1974 by waiving its sovereign immunity
for such intentional torts when committed by federal investigative and law enforcement
personnel, largely in response to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
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cannot be held liable, including, among other things, claims aris-
ing out of combat activities during a time of war,'35 and claims
"arising in a foreign country."3 6
The FTCA, however, did not provide that it was the exclusive
remedy,3 7 but simply allowed a person to sue the United States in
order to be assured of a remedy, given the deep pockets of the
government. Thus, even though the United States excluded its
own liability for discretionary acts and most intentional acts (ar-
guably signaling that such cannot be within an official's authori-
ty), nothing prevented victims from suing an individual officer for
such acts. 38 Individual officers found liable could approach Con-
gress for indemnification just like they had for over a century,
with Congress retaining the ability to decide when and under
what circumstances to indemnify the officials.3 9 Similarly, vic-
tims ostensibly could still approach Congress for redress in the
event a court likely would find an officer immune because such
acts were either within his authority (in the case of head of a de-
partment), or resulted from a simple error in judgment (a discre-
tionary act)."'
Each of these acts that Congress took-the retention of tort
claims, the creation of the committee to hear claims, the creation
of the Court of Claims, the passage of the Tucker Act, and ulti-
mately the passage of the FTCA-was done with the intent to en-
sure adequate and prompt relief to victims of harm, not to avoid
compensating individuals for harm. In this way, Congress stayed
true to the founders' intent to compensate individuals, including
aliens, for harm done to them by U.S. officials. Unfortunately,
roadblocks soon arose, frustrating the ability to compensate those
injured by U.S. officials, especially injured aliens-a group the
founders had been so adamant about having redress for injuries
caused by torts in violation of the law of nations.
of Narcotics. Shimomura, supra note 106, at 693 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982)).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 2680j) (2006).
136. Id. § 2680(k) (2006).
137. In addition to the statute itself omitting such language, see Wilson, supra note 26,
at 208.
138. See id.
139. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 88, at 1868.
140. See David W. Fuller, Intentional Torts and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 8 ST. THOMAs L. REV. 375, 385 (2011).
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II. THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
As outlined above, the founders of the United States under-
stood that the country had a legal obligation under international
law to provide remedies to those who suffered injuries when their
rights under international law were violated. In fact, as discussed
above, many scholars have noted that Congress created federal
jurisdiction over aliens' suits for violation of the law of nations in
order to meet this obligation. 4 ' This was because the denial of
justice-such as failure to provide a judicial remedy-was seen as
a separate injury."
The obligation to ensure a remedy was reaffirmed in the mid-
twentieth century through various United Nations resolutions
and treaties, including treaties the United States has ratified."'
Not only does the Universal Declaration of Human Rights state
that "[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the com-
petent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law,""' but also sev-
eral of the treaties the United States has ratified also contain a
provision guaranteeing a remedy to an alien whose rights under
international law have been violated, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' 5 and the Convention
Against Torture.' 6 Moreover, it has become increasingly recog-
141. Randall, supra note 31, at 20-21 (citing L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H.
SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAw 685-87 (1980)); cf. Myres McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell &
Lung-chu Chen, Nationality and Haman Rights: The Protection of the Individual in Exter-
nal Arenas, 83 YALE L.J. 900 (1974) (discussing United States jurisdiction over nationality
issues).
142. Randall, supra note 31, at 20-21.
143. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U.N.
Doc. AIRES/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.
2(3)(a), opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 14, Dec. 10, 1984,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
144. G.A. Res. 217(III)A, svpra note 144, art. 8.
145. "Each state party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any per-
son whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(3)(a), opened
for signature, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
146. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 ("Each State Party shall ensure in its le-
gal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right
to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possi-
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nized that customary international law requires that nations pro-
vide a remedy to aliens for injuries arising from that nation's vio-
lation of international law, as evidenced by our own Restatement
of the Law,4 7 by scholars, 48 and by the United Nations. 9
III. MODERN ROADBLOCKS TO PROVIDING REMEDIES TO ALIENS
INJURED BY U.S. OFFICIALS
Notwithstanding the requirement of a remedy under interna-
tional law and the founders' desire that aliens be provided a rem-
edy for violations of their rights, in the last few decades both
Congress and the courts have erected roadblocks that have great-
ly limited aliens' ability to receive compensation for injuries
caused by U.S. officials' violations of both customary internation-
al law and domestic law. Such roadblocks are inconsistent with
the desires of the country's founders and with obligations under
international law. They are also problematic and hypocritical be-
cause the roadblocks usually do not prevent aliens (or citizens)
from seeking remedies for similar violations perpetrated by for-
ble. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependents
shall be entitled to compensation.").
147. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
article 14, section 711 (1987) reads:
State Responsibility for Injury To Nationals of Other States
A state is responsible under international law for injury to a national of an-
other state caused by an official act or omission that violates
(a) a human right that, under § 701, a state is obligated to respect for
all persons subject to its authority;
(b) a personal right that, under international law, a state is obligated
to respect for individuals of foreign nationality; or
(c) a right to property or another economic interest that, under inter-
national law, a state is obligated to respect for persons, natural or ju-
ridical, of foreign nationality, as provided in § 712.
Id.
148. See Jordan J, Paust, Civil Liability of Bush, Cheney, et al. for Torture, Cruet, In-
human, and Degrading Treatment and Forced Disappearance, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
359, 361-71 (2009).
149. In 2005, the United Nations issued the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005). The
U.N. noted the right to "equal and effective access to justice." See id. annex. pt. II, 3(c),
pt. VII, 11(c). It also noted the right to an effective judicial remedy for victims of viola-
tions of human rights. Id. annex. pt. VII, 12. It further noted the right to "[a]dequate,
effective and prompt reparation" and "compensation, rehabilitation, [and] satisfaction"
required by international law. Id. annex. pt. IX, 15-22.
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eign officials.' These relatively recent doctrinal and statutory
roadblocks almost always result in courts' dismissals of aliens'
tort claims against U.S. officials for violations of the law of na-
tions, typically brought under the ATS, and claims for violations
of the U.S. Constitution, typically brought pursuant to Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics("Bivens claims")."'
There are several roadblocks. Some have arisen haphazardly as
Congress first moved toward waiving more of the United States'
sovereign immunity, then created exceptions and restrictions
which the courts have often narrowly interpreted to insulate the
United States from liability."2 At the same time, others have
arisen as courts have created or broadened common law immuni-
ties for U.S. officials who violate constitutional and international
legal standards. 5 ' Rather than interpreting such congressional
statutes and common law doctrines to ensure that aliens are pro-
vided with redress, the opposite has taken place, with courts of-
ten interpreting such statutes and doctrines to preclude aliens
from receiving remedies, even when the most severe deprivations
take place, such as torture and prolonged arbitrary detention.
5 4
Moreover, when one looks at the development of the various doc-
trines since the mid-1900s, one questions whether courts and
Congress really understood what each was doing, or how their
own and combined actions resulted in such restriction of reme-
dies."5
150. See discussion, infra Section III.A.5.
151. 403 U.S. 388, 389-90 (1971) (providing a cause of action to recover for damages
resulting from a constitutional violation by a federal agent).
152. See supra Section I.D (discussing Congress' shift toward waiving sovereign im-
munity); supra Section I.E (the enactment of the FTCA and its impact on the United
States' approach to sovereign immunity).
153. See Sosa v. Albvarez.Machair, 542 U.S. 692, 783 n.21 (2003) ("case specific defer-
ence" prudential doctrine for cases that implicate foreign relations); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982) (government official qualified immunity); supra notes 20-24
and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers (Rasul 1), 512 F.3d 644, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated
by 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), remanded to 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding U.S. officials
acted within the scope of their employment even if they allegedly committed human rights
violations such as torture or prolonged detention).
155. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30-33 (1953); Vicki Jackson, Su-
ing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GaO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 521, 564 (2003) ("In the first case considering the discretionary func-
tion exemption, Dalehite v. United States, the Supreme Court gave it an expansive read-
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The roadblocks that Congress or the courts have erected in-
clude the Westfall Act, which allows the United States to substi-
tute itself as a defendant for a U.S. official it finds was "acting
within the scope" of her or his employment, and then provides
that a suit under the FTCA is the exclusive remedy; various stat-
utory exceptions written into the FTCA, and courts' interpreta-
tion of them; the political question doctrine; and the "case-specific
deference" doctrine.156 Roadblocks specific to Bivens claims in-
clude the increasing difficulty of defeating the courts' common
law doctrine of qualified immunity unless there is a "clearly es-
tablished" constitutional or statutory right, and the increasing
difficulty of stating a Bivens claim given the doctrine of "special
factors counselling hesitation."57
A. Individual Officer Immunity, the Westfall Act of 1988, and
FTCA Exclusions
As mentioned earlier, Congress increasingly waived more and
more of its sovereign immunity as it became increasingly over-
whelmed with claims filed with it and with the Court of Claims,
but it did not waive sovereign immunity over tort claims until
1946, when it enacted the FTCA. 6 This waiver did not mean that
the FTCA was the exclusive method for an individual who sought
redress: he or she could still often sue an individual officer, even
if the wrongful or negligent act was covered by the FTCA.155 In
addition, a citizen or alien could still sue an officer for those acts
that were intentional or for those that took place outside the
ing, one that imposes significant limitations on the FTCA as a basis for tort liability of the
government in circumstances where private parties would be liable."); see also Williams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 857 (1955); Wilson, supra note 26, at 211 (analyzing the Court's
decision and its repercussions when it made the decision to change the statute and favor
respondeat superior to federal common law to determine the scope of employment).
156. Federal Employees Reform and Tort Compensation (Westfall) Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006)); Sosa, 542
U.S. at 733 n.21 (discussing "case-specific deference" doctrine); see supra note 134 and ac-
companying text (discussion of the various statutory exceptions in the FTCA); supra note
23 and accompanying text (discussion of political question doctrine).
157. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bu-
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
158. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1947) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)); see Shimomura, supra note 106, at 682-92.
159. See Wilson, supra note 26, at 208.
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United States.6 To understand the limitations of remedies for
torts against aliens by U.S. officials, one cannot review the FTCA
and its development and the development of individual officer li-
ability in silos. Rather, they must be viewed in conjunction with
each other.
Recall that in the mid-1800s, federal courts became reluctant
to hold U.S. officials individually liable for mere "errors in judg-
ment," but found officials could be sued for acts outside of their
authority or where they had malicious or wrongful intent.' If
found individually liable, a defendant could seek indemnification
from Congress.'"' In 1896, the Supreme Court extended the abso-
lute immunity previously enjoyed by members of Congress to cab-
inet-level officers and heads of executive departments, granting
them immunity for all acts within their authority, regardless of
whether they had wrongful motives.'63 In those situations where
officers received immunity either because the acts causing harm
were discretionary acts (mere errors in judgment) or, in the case
of a high-level executive, for all acts within the scope of his em-
ployment, a victim could petition Congress for remedy through
mechanisms Congress had in place at the time."'
After the passage of the FTCA, a victim of wrongful conduct by
a U.S. official could sue the United States for many negligent and
wrongful acts, but not for intentional or discretionary acts.165 With
regard to intentional acts, individuals could still sue the individ-
ual officer for such acts.'66 The only real limitation at this point
was that executive level individuals might be found to be immune
from suit if a court determined that such acts were within the
scope of authority, but it was unlikely at the time that such in-
tentional acts would be found to be within the scope of authori-
160. See generally supra Section I.E (providing background discussion about what
claims were still available to individual parties after the FTCA was passed).
161. See Wilson, supra note 26, at 207 (citing Spalding v. Viles, 161 U.S. 483, 498
(1896)).
162. See Tracy v. Swartwourt, 35 U.S. 80, 98-99 (1836); Pfander & Hunt, supra note
88, at 1868, 1876.
163. See discussion supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
164. See discussion supra note 108; see also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-
40 (1950) (noting that when otherwise actionable wrongs were committed by agents of the
federal government, relief was often sought through private bills in Congress).
165. See discussion supra notes 132-34.
166. See discussion supra note 137.
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ty.'67 The other limitation at this point was that officials could not
be sued for simple errors in judgment-in other words, discre-
tionary acts.'68 When Congress enacted the FTCA in 1946 and
waived liability for torts, it did not waive immunity for torts aris-
ing from "discretionary" acts within an official's authority."9
The first major development after the enactment of the FTCA
that limited remedies was a 1953 case in which the Supreme
Court read this FTCA discretionary function exception very
broadly. In Dalehite v. United States, the Court interpreted the
discretionary function exception to include all situations involv-
ing the formulation or execution of plans drafted at a high level of
government which entailed the exercise of judgment.76 Arguably,
this reading effectively ruled out many substantive tort actions
against the government. 7'
Another Supreme Court decision that would have significant
future repercussions with the passage of the Westfall Act in 1988,
came in 1955, when the Court issued a one sentence ruling in
Williams v. United States finding that state respondeat superior
law should be used to determine the "scope of [an employee's] of-
fice or employment" in determining when the United States
would waive immunity for a tort committed by a U.S. employee. 7
2
In so doing, as Professor Elizabeth Wilson describes, the Court ef-
fectively changed the statute from one where the United States
would be liable as if it were a private person under the law of the
place, to one under which the United States would be liable as if
it were an employer of the private person under law of the
place.'73 Although the Williams case was without analysis, it is
167. See discussion supra note 137.
168. See discussion supra note 108 and accompanying text.
169. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). Specifically, Congress did not waive immunity for any
claim "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Govern-
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." Id.
170. 346 U.S. 15, 35-36 (1953).
171. See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and
Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 521, 564 (2003) (citation omitted) ("In
the first case considering the discretionary function exemption, Dalehite v. United States,
the Supreme Court gave it an expansive reading, one that imposes significant limitations
on the FTCA as a basis for tort liability of the government in circumstances where private
parties would be liable.").
172. 350 U.S. 857, 857 (1955) (per curiam).
173. Wilson, supra note 26, at 212.
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likely that the Court was relying both on the language "in accord-
ance with the law of the place," and its 1950 case of Feres v. Unit-
ed States, in which it held that 'law of the place" meant state law,
given that the United States meant to waive liability for garden
variety torts, which are traditionally governed by state law.' 74
This also has implications for tort claims under international law,
as discussed in Section IV,"5 because subsequent cases have ex-
cluded customary international law as "law of the place" for pur-
poses of liability under the FTCA.'
In any event, the Williams decision meant that in determining
the scope of employment and thus the United States' waiver of li-
ability, courts would look to state respondeat superior law. 177 State
courts have typically interpreted "scope of employment" very
broadly in order to ensure victims have "deep pocket" remedies.
Given this broad interpretation, the Williams decision was a posi-
tive one for individuals harmed by acts of a government official,
since many tortious actions are found to be "within the scope of
authority," and thus a suit for damages can proceed under the
FTCA. Unfortunately, as discussed later, this originally positive
formulation has operated to greatly limit remedies-especially for
aliens injured by U.S. officials-during the last decade after en-
actment of the Westfall Act.
The next significant development came in 1959 in the case of
Barr v. Matteo, in which the Supreme Court extended absolute
official immunity (immunity within the scope of authority, re-
gardless of intent) to lower level officials for all acts, discretionary
or not, including those acts within the "outer perimeter" of such
authority.'7 ' The extension was still arguably limited to those of
"policy-making rank," given that the Court noted higher-level of-
ficials would likely get broader immunity because they typically
have greater discretionary authority.'80 However, because this de-
cision limited the types of cases in which a victim of a tort could
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
175. See discussion infra and notes 292-93.
176. Id.
177. Wilson, supra note 26, at 177, 212 (citing Williams, 350 U.S. at 857).
178. See Wilson, supra note 26, at 212.
179. 360 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1959).
180. Id.
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sue an individual directly, and because "discretionary acts" were
exempted from the FTCA, the ability to receive a remedy was re-
stricted.'81 The Court understood this, but found that it was better
to have some cases go uncompensated than to impede on officials'
actions."'
Of course, under the FTCA, a victim could still sue the United
States for an executive official's non-discretionary acts, even if he
would be individually immune from suit under Barr.
In cases involving non-discretionary acts, an official could only
get immunity if the official acted within the scope of authority.8 3
Importantly, whether or not he was acting within the scope of his
authority was not determined by broadly interpreted state re-
spondeat superior law applicable under the FTCA, but instead by
federal common law.8 4 This was partly because the FTCA was not
yet the exclusive remedy for government employee torts, and in-
dividual employee liability determinations were analyzed outside
the statutory regime of the FTCA, which only discusses govern-
ment liability for actions within scope of employment.' This later
changed with the enactment of the Westfall Act.
18 6
In 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court held that federal law en-
forcement officers could be sued personally for violating a per-
son's federal constitutional rights, without the need for statutory
authorization from Congress. 7 The decision was partially in re-
sponse to the fact that the federal government could not be held
liable under the FTCA for intentional acts like assault and false
arrest, given that Congress had excluded intentional acts from its
waiver of sovereign immunity.'88 Following the decision in Bivens,
victims not only could sue a federal officer under state tort law for
181. See id. at 575.
182. Id. at 571, 576.
183. Moreover, in Butz v. Economou, the Supreme Court clarified that the Barr doc-
trine only applied when the official was acting within the scope of his authority as defined
by statutes. 438 U.S. 478, 489 (1978).
184. Professor Wilson discusses this in detail. Wilson, supra note 26, at 215-16 (quot-
ing Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959)).
185. Id. at 216-17.
186. Seeid. at 217.
187. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
188. See id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Butz, 438 U.S. at 504 n.31.
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these sorts of acts, but also could sue officers individually for torts
arising under the U.S. Constitution.' 9 Bivens, however, did not
specifically address the issue of immunity.'"
Subsequently, in the 1974 case of Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Su-
preme Court rejected absolute immunity for state officials' discre-
tionary acts in a Section 1983 action alleging a violation of the
U.S. Constitution.9 ' Rather, the Court found an official could only
claim official immunity for such acts if he acted in good faith and
with a reasonable belief that his actions were lawful and valid.9
Another notable development occurred in 1974. In response to
Bivens and the perceived unfairness of federal officials bearing
the cost of their unlawful acts, Congress amended the FTCA
waiver exception for intentional torts (assault, battery, false im-
prisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecu-
tion) to allow suits against the United States for such claims
when they were against "investigative or law enforcement officers
of the United States Government.""19 However, this amendment
did not make the FTCA the exclusive remedy for such acts, and
thus, the personal liability of the officers themselves remained
under the qualified immunity doctrines in place at the time, re-
gardless of whether the torts were general state law torts or con-
stitutional torts. 1
94
In 1978, the Court extended the qualified immunity outlined in
Scheuer to include Bivens claims in Butz v. Economou.'9s The
Court was largely motivated by the fact that the FTCA excluded
the United States' liability for such discretionary acts, whether or
189. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390-91.
190. Id. at 397-98.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).
192. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48 ("It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the be-
lief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief,
that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in
course of official conduct.")
193. See Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982)); see also S. REP. No. 93-588, § 2 (1974), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2791.
194. See 88 Stat. at 50.
195. 438 U.S. 478, 500-01, (1978) (citing Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48
(1974); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397).
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not such discretion was abused, and if there continued to be abso-
lute immunity, victims would receive no compensation as a reme-
dy.
9 6
The Supreme Court decisions during this era resulted in the
expansion of personal liability of individual officers (even though
the government in 1974 also accepted liability for at least inten-
tional acts by federal law enforcement officers) by finding federal
officials were liable for federal constitutional torts and by limiting
the scope of their immunity. Through the decisions limiting of-
ficer immunity, the Court was perhaps reconciling prior immuni-
ty decisions with the enactment of the FTCA, with which the
United States had changed the regime of private claims before
Congress (and later, the Court of Claims) to the courts, and in do-
ing so, excluded discretionary and intentional acts.198 These deci-
sions for the most part all worked either to retain or to ensure
victims harmed by U.S. officials' actions were remedied, staying
true to the founders' intentions.
This all changed, however, in the 1980s. First came the 1982
case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, in which the Supreme Court nar-
rowed the standard for individual liability of U.S. officials by
eliminating any consideration of whether the officer was acting in
bad faith; this consideration had, for some time, been part of the
analysis in determining liability. 99 No longer was acting in bad
faith a way to defeat immunity; rather, the Court set forth the
new standard that "government officials performing discretionary
functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statu-
196. Butz, 438 U.S. at 505. The Court held
If, as the Government argues, all officials exercising discretion were exempt
from personal liability, a suit under the Constitution could provide no redress
to the injured citizen, nor would it in any degree deter federal officials from
committing constitutional wrongs. Moreover, no compensation would be
available from the Government, for the Tort Claims Act prohibits recovery for
injuries stemming from discretionary acts, even when that discretion has
been abused.
Id.
197. See Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982)); Butz, 438 U.S. at 500-01; Scheuer 416 U.S. at 247-48.
198. Compare Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 982, 983, 984, 985 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2680(a)(b) (1952)), with Butz, 438 U.S. at 500-01, and
Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48.
199. See 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
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tory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.""2 '
In 1988, Congress quickly took action to reverse the Supreme
Court2"1 after the Court expanded individual officer liability in
state tort lawsuits by limiting the doctrine of absolute immunity
in such suits against federal officials in Westfall v. Erwin."2 In
Westfall, the Court ruled that officials were only immune if their
actions were within the scope of their employment (even if on the
outer perimeter of such scope) and discretionary in nature."3 Re-
call that under Barr, federal officials received immunity for any
act within their authority-even for acts within the outer limit of
authority-whether or not the acts were discretionary in na-
ture.0 4 Under Westfall, the individual official could now be indi-
vidually liable for non-discretionary acts even if they were within
the scope of his employment.2"' The Court found that "absolute
immunity for nondiscretionary functions finds no support in the
traditional justification for official immunity.""6 The Court ex-
plained that the purpose behind absolute immunity was to allow
government officials to exercise their discretionary authority
without fear or trepidation, and such reasoning did not apply to
non-discretionary acts that harm someone.0 7 The Court recog-
nized that absolute immunity comes with great costs, stating,
"[a]n injured party with an otherwise meritorious tort claim is
denied compensation simply because he had the misfortune to be
injured by a federal official. Moreover, absolute immunity contra-
venes the basic tenet that individuals be held accountable for
their wrongful conduct. 2 8
The FTCA excludes discretionary acts, but suits can still go
forward against the United States for most non-discretionary acts
of an employee acting within the scope of his employment, the on-
200. Id. at 817-18.
201. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563.
202. 484 U.S. 292, 296-98 (1988).
203. Id. at 298-99.
204. See 360 U.S. 564, 574-75.
205. 484 U.S. at 297.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 296-97 (citing Barr v. Matleo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959)).
208. Id. at 295.
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ly exception being intentional acts by non-law enforcement or in-
vestigative officers.2 9 Because "within the scope of employment"
for purposes of government liability under the FTCA is interpret-
ed broadly, individuals can typically find relief in suits against
the government for wrongful or negligent non-discretionary acts
of government employees." ' Until this point, though, victims
could still sue U.S. employees for intentional torts, including law
enforcement officers because the FTCA was not the exclusive pro-
cedure for obtaining a remedy.211 Injured individuals could get re-
lief if the court found the officer was not acting within the scope
of his or her authority under the federal common law test.212 West-
fall's effect was that, even if an official was acting within the
scope of her authority, victims could bring a suit directly against
the officer, as long as the acts were not discretionary in nature.2 2
For constitutional violations, there was also limited liability for
discretionary acts that violated the Constitution.214
Even though discretionary acts had been interpreted quite
broadly since 1953, this seemed a somewhat fair regime, as it
protected both the United States and government employees, in-
dividually, for discretionary actions within the scope of employ-
ment, as determined by federal common law.2 5 The Court struck
this balance, though it did not last long. Congress moved immedi-
ately to reverse Westfall in legislation that would have grave fu-
ture impacts on the ability of aliens, and others, to secure a rem-
edy when injured through tortious acts of government
employees.216
209. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(h) (1982).
210. See id. § 1346(b); Wilson, supra note 26, at 186.
211. See Wilson, supra note 26, at 186.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Scott v. Demenna, 840 F.2d 8, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
214. See, e.g., Brian Shea, The Parent Trap: Constitutional Violations and the Federal
Tort Claims Act's Discretionary Function Execution, 52 B.C. L. REV. 57, 58 (2011) (citing
Castro v. United States (Castro II), 560 P.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2009)).
215. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2080; see, e.g., William P. Kratzke, The Supreme Court's
Recent Overhaul of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Torts Claims Act, 7
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 2-3 (1993); Wilson, supra note 26, at 176.
216. See Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679 (1988)); James D. Doster, Note, The Westfall Act Before and After Gutierrez de Mar-
tinez v. Lamagno: Reviewability, Remand, and Article III-One Down, One to Go, and One
that Should Be Left Alone, 32 GA. L. REV. 181, 1885-86 (1997).
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1. Enactment of the Westfall Act of 1988
As described above, the FTCA itself did not affect an alien's
right to seek a remedy directly against U.S. officials in their indi-
vidual capacities for human rights abuses, either for acts covered
by the FTCA or those that were excluded, because the FTCA was
not the exclusive remedy.217 This changed, however, with the en-
actment of the Federal Employees Reform and Tort Compensa-
tion Act ("FERTC") of 1988, also known as the Westfall Act.21s The
primary motivation of Congress in enacting the Act was to over-
turn the Westfall decision and ensure that all employees acting
within the scope of employment received immunity from suit, not
just those higher-level employees who exercise a high degree of
discretion.21
The FERTC made two changes that greatly affected the ability
of individuals, including aliens, to seek and acquire a remedy.
First, it allows the substitution of the United States for the indi-
vidual defendant when the Attorney General certifies that the
employee was acting within the scope of employment when he en-
gaged in the tortious conduct.22° Second, it makes such actions,
when the certification occurs, exclusive;"' in other words, no
longer can a victim also sue an individual officer for such actions
deemed "within the scope of . . . employment." '22 As discussed
above, the Supreme Court had previously interpreted the "scope
of employment" provision of the FTCA using state respondeat su-
perior law, which interprets scope of employment broadly, rather
than using federal common law, as it had previously.222 Lower
courts have since found that respondeat superior state law gov-
erns the "scope of employment" provision under the Westfall Act,
rather than federal common law that previously governed com-
217. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1296(h), 1346(b) (2006).
218. See Pub. L. No. 100.694, § 2(a)(7)(b), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4563, 4563-
64.
219. See id.; Wilson, supra note 26, at 176.
220. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a), (d)(1); Wilson, supra note 26, at 176.
221. The Westfall Act amended the FTCA to make its remedy against the United
States the exclusive remedy for most claims against Government employees arising out of
their official conduct, stating that the remedy against the United States is "exclusive of
any other civil action or proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1).
222. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a), (d)(1).
223. See Wilson, supra note 26, at 176-77.
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mon law official immunity.24 This means federal courts almost
always find officials to be acting within the scope of employ-
ment."2 When this occurs, the United States is substituted, and
victims are left with only those remedies the FTCA allows
them. 6 Such remedies are excluded for intentional acts of non-
federal law enforcement officers,227 discretionary acts,"' and ac-
tions that arise in a foreign country.29
The Westfall Act did provide for two exceptions where substitu-
tion would not be allowed: suits for constitutional violations2 ' and
suits for violations of a U.S. statute which otherwise authorizes
an action against an individual employee. 3' There is no exception
for claims brought under customary international law for federal
common law. Moreover, because the Supreme Court has deemed
the ATS to be only a jurisdictional statute only with federal com-
mon law providing the cause of action under the ATS,"2 courts
have held that the ATS does not qualify as a statutory exception
to the Westfall Act. 83
a. Scope of Employment and Substitution Under the Westfall Act
The substitution provision of the Westfall Act provides that
[ulpon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant em-
ployee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the
time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action...
upon such a claim. .. shall be deemed an action against the United
224. See, e.g., Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
225. See Wilson, supra note 26, at 176-78, 204; see, e.g., Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 419 F.
Supp. 26, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
226. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1).
227. Id. § 2680(h).
228. Id. § 2680(a).
229. Id. § 2680(k).
230. Id. § 2679(b)(11)-(12). Pursuant to section 2679(b)(2), the immunity granted by
section 2679(b)(1) "does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the
Government. .. brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States." Id. §
2679(b)(2)(A).
231. Id. § 2679(b)(2)(B).
232. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714, 724 (2004).
233. See, e.g., Hamad v. Gates, No. C10-591 MJP, 2011 WL 6130413, at *9 (W.D.
Wash., Dec. 8, 2011); Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 115 (D.D.C., 2010); In
re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 112 (D.D.C. 2007); Harbury v. Hayden,
444 F. Supp. 2d 19, 37-38 (D.D.C., 2006), affd, 522 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
555 U.S. 881 (2008); Bancoult v. McNamara, 370 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2004).
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States... and the United States shall be substituted as the party
defendant.
2 34
Under the Westfall Act, if the U.S. Attorney General certifies
that a U.S. official was acting within the scope of his employment
when committing a "negligent or wrongful act or omission" and a
court agrees after having reviewed a plaintiff's rebuttal to the
presumption this certification creates, the United States can sub-
stitute itself for the U.S. official as the defendant, thereby limit-
ing claims and remedies to those allowed against the United
States under the FTCA.235 Thus, a court's finding as to whether or
not a U.S. official acted "within the scope of his employment" can
make all the difference between an alien having, or not having, a
remedy for human rights abuses he or she experiences at the
hands of a U.S. official. 235
In cases involving U.S. officials' alleged tort violations of inter-
national human rights law, courts have unanimously found the
officials to be acting within the scope of their employment, apply-
ing state respondeat superior law, even where the acts alleged are
clear or egregious violations of international law.237 As long as the
acts were tied in some way to the officials' employment, courts
have generally found the officials were acting within the scope of
their employment, and plaintiffs have been left to proceed under
the limited waiver of the FTCA, which provides little, if any, re-
lief for violations of customary international law.238 These findings
and the subsequent substitution of the United States as defend-
ant results in an immunity of sorts and in the consequent barrier
234. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1).
235. Id. § 2679(b), (d)(1) (2006). Certification by the Attorney General "does not conclu-
sively establish as correct the substitution of the United States as defendant in place of
the employee." Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 434 (1995) (stating that
certification shifts the burden to the plaintiff to challenge the Attorney General's actions
by "coming forward with specific facts rebutting the certification"); see also Council on Am.
Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Stokes v. Cross,
327 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) (finding that an Attorney General's certification that
a Congressman was acting within his scope of employment was correct under District of
Columbia law).
236. See, e.g., At-Zahrani, 684 F. Supp. at 105-06, 108.
237. See, e.g., Harbury, 522 F.3d 422; Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 265
(D.D.C. 2004). In both Harbury and Schneider, the court ruled the state law claims were
preempted under the political question doctrine. 684 F. Supp. 2d at 421; 310 F. Supp. 2d
at 261.
238. See Harbury, 522 F.3d at 422; Schneider, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 265-66; see also Al-
Zahrani, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 105-06.
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to a remedy for harm, even for the most egregious human rights
abuses.23
Perhaps nowhere have courts' findings that U.S officials' al-
leged egregious human rights violations were within the scope of
employment for purposes of the Westfall Act been more trouble-
some than the recent dismissals of claims brought by former
Guantanamo Bay detainees against a variety of U.S. officials,
such as Donald Rumsfeld and several military officials, for tort
violations of the law of nations, including torture, extrajudicial
killing, prolonged arbitrary detention, and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment. 4 ' The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Rasul v. Myers issued the first circuit opinion re-
garding this subject, affirming a D.C. federal district court's rul-
ing that U.S. officials acted within the scope of their employment
even if they did engage in egregious human rights abuses such as
torture, CIDT, and prolonged arbitrary detention. 241 In Rasul, the
court applied the "law of the place" to determine the scope of em-
ployment, which was tort law within the District of Columbia
law.42 Applying that law, which considered whether conduct was
"incidental" and "foreseeable," and whether the perpetrator's in-
tent was to serve the master, the court found even egregious acts
such as torture were within the scope of employment, thereby re-
sulting in the substitution of the United States as the defendant
and leaving the FTCA as the sole remaining remedy.242
239. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1); Harbury, 522 F. 3d at 422.
240. See, e.g., Al-Zahrani, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
241. 512 F.3d 644, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated by - U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008),
reinstated in rel. part by 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
242. Id. at 655 (quoting Majano v. United States, 469 F.3d 138, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
243. See id. at 658-60 (citing Council on Am. Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d
659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
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Similar cases have met similar outcomes. 24 The D.C. court,
which has been the court to decide most of these cases, has reject-
ed plaintiffs' arguments that jus cogens violations of international
law should be per se evidence of an official having acted outside
the scope of employment.245 As discussed in more detail below,
this is contrary to other courts' decisions that foreign officials
have acted outside the scope of their employment for purposes of
foreign sovereign immunity when engaging in such severe viola-
tions, because in those cases, courts apply federal common law to
the "scope of authority" question.46
b. FTCA Becomes the Exclusive Remedy After the Westfall Act
After substitution of the United States as defendant, the West-
fall Act becomes the exclusive remedy for all acts within the scope
of employment, with the exception of Bivens claims and statutory
provisions that otherwise provide a remedy for tortious acts.24
7
With regard to statutory provisions, the Supreme Court in 2004
found that the ATS was a jurisdictional statute only and thus did
not provide for a cause of action, but that the cause of action was
provided by federal common law.2 8 Lower courts have unani-
mously found claims for violations of customary international law
through the ATS do not fit within the statutory exception of the
Westfall Act. 249 Given the exclusivity provision of the Westfall Act,
this has left aliens whose rights under international human
244. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al Janko v.
Gates, 831 F. Supp. 2d 272, 281-82 (D.D.C. 2011); Hamad v. Gates, No. C1O-591MJP,
2011 WL 6130413, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2011) (citations omitted) ("[Under Virginia
law] an act is within the scope of employment if it was 'fairly and naturally incident to the
business' and if it was done 'while the servant was engaged upon the master's business
and be done, although mistakenly or ill-advisably, . . . to further the master's interests'
and did not arise 'wholly from some external, independent, and personal motive on the
part of the servant."'); AI-Zahrani, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (finding that scope of employ-
ment may include torture and serious criminal conduct); In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig.,
479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 114 (D.D.C. 2007).
245. See, e.g., In re Iraq & Aig. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 113-14.
246. See infra notes 280-85 and accompanying text.
247. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2) (2006),
248. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714, 724 (2004).
249. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text. The Torture Victim Protection Act
only applies to torture and extrajudicial killing by individuals "acting in an official capaci-
ty for any foreign nation," not by U.S. officials. Act of Mar. 12, 1992, Pub. L. 102-256, 106
Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350); see, e.g., In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F.
Supp. 2d at 112.
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rights law have been violated by U.S. officials unable to seek
remedies from the individuals harming them.
2. No Remedy for Intentional Acts
When the employee has been deemed to be acting within the
scope of authority and the United States is substituted as a de-
fendant, victims' claims must proceed under the FTCA due to the
exclusivity of the Westfall Act; this is their only option. Thus, vic-
tims can then only seek a remedy for those acts for which the
United States has waived immunity.5 ° In addition to excluding
discretionary acts, the FTCA also excludes intentional acts by
non-federal law-enforcement officers, such as assault and false
imprisonment."5 ' When the "intentional tort" exception to the
waiver was enacted as part of the original act in 1946, victims
could still seek a remedy against the individual officers."2 Thus,
the effect of the enactment of the FTCA was to provide more rem-
edies for victims of U.S. officials' wrongful actions, not restrict
them. But once the Westfall Act was enacted, this changed. 5' One
wonders if this result was what Congress had in mind when it
enacted the Westfall Act in 1988.
In fact, according to the legislative history of the Westfall Act,
Congress never intended to make intentional, egregious tort vio-
lations, such as torture, subject to the Westfall Act's exclusive
remedy provision. The House Report on the Westfall Act clearly
states that "[i]f an employee is accused of egregious misconduct
rather than mere negligence or poor judgment, then the United
States may not be substituted as the defendant, and the individ-
ual employee remains liable." '254 Additionally, when discussing
what actions would be covered by the Westfall Act, Representa-
tive Barney Frank, who drafted the bill, stated, "we are not talk-
ing about intentional acts of harming people."255 Also, the purpose
250. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).
251. Id. § 2680(a)(h) (2006).
252. See id. § 1346(b) (1952).
253. Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679).
254. H.R. REP. No. 100-700, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5949.
255. 134 CONG. REC. 15963 (daily ed. June 27, 1988) (statement of Rep. Frank).
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of the Westfall Act was simply to overturn Westfall and return
the law to what it was before in Barr v. Matteo.55
Moreover, the Westfall Act was never meant to provide immun-
ity for torture. In an amicus brief submitted to the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, Representative Frank wrote of
the Act's reach that "[a]n official engaged in torture . . . was to
stand alone in facing the legal consequences of his or her ac-
tions."'257 The bill's original sponsor, Representative Dante Fascell,
agreed: "Torture is an insidious practice of brutality which is the
most egregious example of man's inhumanity toward man. Tor-
ture is antithetical to our respect for the rights and dignity of the
individual-it is violent; it is abhorrent; and it is illegal. 2 8
Unfortunately, however, Congress' intent was not realized in
the statute due to incompetence, misunderstanding, or some oth-
er reason. Courts interpreted the scope of employment under the
FTCA very broadly under state respondeat superior law at the
time of the Westfall Act in 1988, but the Act did not specify a dif-
ferent test for scope of employment.5 9 Nothing suggests Congress
really understood the implications of the scope of employment
provision of the Westfall Act.
Given the legislative history, one could argue that Congress on-
ly intended substitution for those acts for which the United
States had already waived its immunity and not for intentional
acts. But this is not how the Westfall Act was written, nor is it
how the courts have interpreted it. Congress could easily clarify
this inconsistency through additional legislation.
256. H.R. REP. No. 100-700, at 4, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5947; see West-
fall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); see also Jamison v.
Willey, 14 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 1994).
257. Brief for United States Representative Barney Frank as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Appellant at 7, Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413 (1988) (No. 06-cv-5282); see also 134
CONG. REC. 15963 (daily ed. June 27, 1988) (statement of Rep. Frank) ("[We are not talk-
ing about intentional acts of harming people.").
258. 130 CONG. REC. 24858 (1984); see also 130 CONG. REC. 24861 (1984) (statement of
Rep. Brown) ("[A] fair and just legal system ... has no room for torture.'); 130 CONG. REC.
24860 (1984) (statement of Rep. Broomfield) ("[T]he U.S. Government has always taken a
strong stand against the practice of torture.").
259. Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 26 (2006)).
20131
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
3. Those Who Suffer Claims "Arising in a Foreign Country" Are
Not Entitled to a Remedy
As mentioned above, the FTCA contains a foreign country ex-
ception whereby the United States has not waived its immunity
for abuses by U.S. officials in a "foreign country.""26 The foreign
country exception was included in the FTCA to ensure that the
United States would not be subject to a foreign country's laws,
given the "in accordance with the law of the place" language in
the Act.261 As discussed below, the Supreme Court has read this
exception broadly, leaving no possibility of a judicial remedy for
those aliens (and citizens) who suffer injury outside the geograph-
ic borders of the United States. This exception applies even when
no other sovereign's law is at issue and even when the injury re-
sults from acts occurring within the United States."2
The seminal case involving the foreign country exception is the
1993 case of Smith v. United States.263 In Smith, the Supreme
Court held that Antarctica was considered a foreign country for
purposes of the FTCA, even though it had no government, was
sovereignless, and as such, had no tort law of its own. 4 The
Court made this finding notwithstanding the fact that the main
purpose of the foreign country exception was to prevent the Unit-
ed States being subject to another country's laws.265 The Court
noted that other parts of the FTCA indicated "foreign country"
would include a country such as Antarctica. 6 First, the Court
pointed to the language of 28 U.S.C. §1346(b), wherein the United
States waived sovereign immunity for acts committed by certain
federal officials "under circumstances where the United States, if
a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.,267
260. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2006).
261. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 707 (2004); United States v. Spe-
lar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949).
262. See, e.g., Al Janko v. Gates, 831 F. Supp. 2d 272, 284 (D.D.C. 2011); Hamad v.
Gates, No. C1O-591 MJP, 2011 WL 6130413, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2011); AI-Zahrani
v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 119 (D.D.C. 2010).
263. 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
264. Id. at 198, 201-02.
265. Id. at 200-01.
266. Id. at 201-02.
267. Id. at 201 (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988)).
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The Court noted that the provision required application of the
"law of the place" where the tort occurred, and because Antarctica
had no law, application of this provision in the context of injury
occurring there would not make sense.268 Thus, the Court found
that only injuries occurring within the United States were sub-
jected to the FTCA.2"9
In addition, the Court noted that the venue provision of the
FTCA required that the lawsuit be filed in the federal district
court where the act or omission complained of occurred or where
the plaintiff resides.270 In support of its reasoning, the Court noted
that if the plaintiff did not reside in the United States, there
would be no place for the lawsuit to be filed.27'
This particular exception has had grave consequences by way
of lack of a remedy for those who suffer injury at the hands of
U.S. officials abroad.2 Although the consequences have been seen
in several cases involving U.S. officials' alleged violations of in-
ternational human rights over the last twenty years,272 such con-
sequences have been recently felt by those who have suffered se-
vere human rights abuses in places such as Guantanamo Bay
268. Id. at 201-02.
269. Id. at 202. Interestingly, earlier drafts of the foreign country exception that Con-
gress ultimately rejected distinguished between citizens' and aliens' claims by including
language exempting those claims "arising in a foreign country on behalf of an alien." Id. at
202 n.4 (emphasis added) (citing S. 2690, 76th Cong., § 303(12) (1939); H.R. 7236, 76th
Cong. § 303(12) (1939)). As the Court noted, the last five words of the proposed bills were
dropped at the suggestion of the Attorney General. Id. (citing Before the House Comm. on
the Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong, 29, 35, 66 (1942)). This
earlier draft would have made the foreign country exception dependent on the citizenship
of the individual harmed; in other words, it would not have exempted claims by U.S. citi-
zens arising in a foreign country, only those by aliens. By refusing to accept the draft mak-
ing this differentiation, Congress signaled that it felt it was important that claims by al-
iens be compensated in the same manner as those by citizens.
270. Id. at 202 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1988)).
271. Id.
272. See Kelly McCracken, Away from Justice and Fairness: The Foreign Country Ex-
ception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 22 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 603, 622-23 (1989).
273. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700-01 (2004) (applying the for-
eign country exception to a Mexican national's claims against a Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration's officer's alleged violation of his rights protected by international law); Harbury
v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 422-32 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 881 (2008) (apply-
ing the exception to FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity for suits based on injuries suf-
fered in a foreign country to bar tort claims of a widow of a rebel fighter allegedly tortured
and killed by members of Guatemalan army who were allegedly gathering information for
the CIA during Guatemala's civil war).
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Naval Base.2 74 Every lower federal court that has considered the
issue has found that the FTCA does not apply to violations of in-
ternational law that occurred at Guantanamo Bay,27" notwith-
standing that the Supreme Court found that although the Guan-
tanamo Bay Naval Base is located within Cuba, the United States
exercises de facto sovereignty.276 In fact, the Supreme Court stat-
ed that, "in every practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is
within the constant jurisdiction of the United States.""2 7
Although one might consider arguing, that "law of the place"
could include customary international law, courts have thus far
rejected this argument,78 given that the Supreme Court has
found that the "law of the place" for purposes of the FTCA is state
law.279
Prior to 2004, the foreign country exception did not bar injured
parties' suits for harm or injuries occurring outside of the United
States, as long as the U.S. officials' actions that led to the injury
took place within the United States, a theory dubbed the "head-
quarters doctrine.""2 This is because the courts could apply the
274. Laura N. Pennelle, The Guantanamo Gap: Can Foreign Nationals Obtain Redress
for Prolonged Arbitrary Detention and Torture Suffered Outside the United States?, 36
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 304, 316 (2006).
275. See Al Janko v. Gates, 831 F. Supp. 2d 272, 284 (D.D.C. 2011); Hamad v. Gates,
No. C10-591MJP, 2011 WL 6130413, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2011); A1-Zahrani v.
Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 119 (D.D.C. 2010).
276. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755, 769 (2008) (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466, 480, 487 (2009)).
277. Id. at 769 (citing Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480; id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment)).
278. Al Janko, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 283 (finding that customary international law is not
state law, and thus not within the FTCA); Bansal v. Russ, 513 F. Supp. 2d 264, 280 (E.D.
Pa. 2007); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307(JG) 2006 WL 1662663, at *50 (E.D.N.Y.
2006), rev'd on other grounds, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009).
279. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994).
280. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 638-39 (9th Cir. 2003) (find-
ing the headquarters doctrine applied because DEA officials in Los Angeles decided to
kidnap the plaintiff and gave instructions from there, and such acts proximately caused
the injuries), rev'd, 542 U.S. 692, 699 (2004); Couzado v. United States, 105 F.3d 1389,
1395 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Donahue v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 751 F. Supp. 45, 48
(S.D.N.Y. 1990)) ("'[A] claim is not barred by section 2680(k) where the tortious conduct
occurs in the United States, but the injury is sustained in a foreign country."'); Eaglin v.
U.S. Dep't of Army, 794 F.2d 981, 983 (5th Cir. 1986) (assuming, arguendo, that the head-
quarters doctrine is valid); Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 761-62 (D.D.C. 1979)
(concluding that the foreign country exception does not exempt the United States from suit
for acts and omissions in United States having operative effect abroad and refusing to ap-
ply the exception where a communique sent from the United States by a federal law en-
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law of the state where the acts or omissions occurred leading to
the injury, thereby not subjecting the United States to foreign
laws.28'
However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument in 2004 in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.22 The Court criticized the doctrine's re-
liance on "proximate cause," and noted that at the time the FTCA
was enacted, choice of law doctrines dictated that courts apply
the law of the place where the harm occurred.88 Given this, the
Court ruled that the FTCA's "arising in a foreign country" excep-
tion applied if the harm or injury occurred outside the United
States.284 Lower federal courts have followed Sosa and found that
those who suffered harm abroad from human rights violations at
the hands of U.S. officials, even as a result of decisions made
within the United States, cannot bring a suit in U.S. courts for
damages.2 '
The rejection of the headquarters doctrine in combination with
the foreign country exception is just another roadblock to those
who have suffered harm at the hands of U.S. officials abroad.
4. The Combination of the FTCA, Westfall Act, and Court
Decisions Has Resulted in a Lack of Remedy for Aliens
The complex combination of the FTCA, its exclusions and ex-
ceptions, developing official immunity doctrines, and the Westfall
Act's substitution and exclusivity provisions has led to a signifi-
forcement officer resulted in plaintiffs wrongful detention in Germany); Leaf v. United
States, 588 F.2d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 1978) ("A claim 'arises', as that term is used in...
2680(k), where the acts or omissions that proximately cause the loss take place.").
281. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 638 (where the court did not explicitly give
the applicability of California law as reasoning, but so insinuated by applying California
law); Couzado, 105 F.3d at 1395 (finding that "law of the place" is where the acts causing
the harm occurred, not where the acts had their operative effect, and thus applying Flori-
da law); Sami, 617 F.2d at 762 (noting specifically that because the applicable law is that
where the act causing the injury occurred, the intent of the foreign country exception is
met).
282. 542 U.S. at 703-04. The case is better known for its affirmance that federal courts
can use their common law power to recognize claims for violations of the law of nations
pursuant to the jurisdictional grant known as the ATS. Id. at 712-37.
283. Id. at 703-05.
284. Id. at 705-06.
285. See Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2008); A1 Janko v, Gates, 831
F. Supp. 2d 272, 284 n.23 (D.D.C. 2011).
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cant narrowing of remedies for all victims of U.S. officials' torts.
However, the foreign country exception, the intentional act exclu-
sion, the Westfall Act, and the findings that the ATS does not fit
within the statutory exclusion of the FTCA, have had a disparate
impact on aliens, and especially aliens subjected to violations of
customary international law, such as torture, CIDT, forced disap-
pearance, prolonged arbitrary detention, and intentional assault
and abuse. The combination of these various statutory provisions
and courts' interpretations of them, have left aliens subjected to
such abuses without a remedy. This is in contradiction to interna-
tional law's requirement that a country provide a remedy to al-
iens whose rights under international law are violated and is con-
trary to the founders' and earlier generations' intent.
5. Foreign Officials Committing Human Rights Violations Are
Held Accountable
Foreign officials who commit torts against aliens in violation
international law are usually held liable in U.S. courts, typically
under the ATS or TVPA. This is appropriate and consistent with
both international law and the desires of the founders and earlier
generations. The liability of foreign officials makes the fact that
U.S. officials are typically not held liable even more troubling.
Recently, in the 2010 case of Samantar v. Yousef,2" the Su-
preme Court affirmed what some circuit courts had already been
holding for some time-that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Act- ' ("FSIA") did not apply to individual foreign officials (even
those acting or sued in their official capacity), but instead applied
only to foreign states.2ss Thus, unlike U.S. officials given immuni-
ty of sorts through the Westfall Act, foreign officials, even those
acting within the scope of their employment, are not statutorily
granted immunity in tort suits brought against them in U.S.
286. 560 U.S. -, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
287. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
288. Samantar, 560 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2286-87 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)
(2006)) (discussing immunity of a foreign state, which "includes a political subdivision of a
foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state").
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courts.8 9 The Court found, however, that common law foreign
sovereign immunity might still apply to those individuals.9 0
Yet, many courts addressing official immunity for violations of
the law of nations by foreign officials, whether under the FSIA
prior to Samantar or under federal common law, have found the
foreign officials were not immunized for their torts because they
exceeded the scope of their employment or authority, especially
where they committed jus cogens violations of customary interna-
tional law.29" ' In fact, a violation of customary international law is
typically considered per se outside the scope of authority when
determining foreign official immunity.9 Rather than applying
the state respondeat superior liability that courts typically apply
in determining whether U.S. officials are acting within the scope
of their employment for purposes of substitution under the West-
fall Act and its resulting immunity, courts apply a different, more
narrow standard to determine scope of employment to claims
against foreign officers, focusing on the legality of the officers'
acts.292 This almost always.results in a finding that the officer was
289. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2289.
290. Id. at__, 130 S. Ct. at 2292 (emphasis added).
291. See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) (footnotes omitted)
(citations omitted) (finding that even if the FSIA applied to individuals, it would not apply
to the defendant given that the allegations were that he committed jus cogens violations,
which "by definition are not legally authorized acts"); Nuru v. Gonzalez, 404 F.3d 1207,
1222-23 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that torture of a Eritrean asylum seeker by Eritrean gov-
ernment officials violated jus cogens norms and can never be authorized by a government
or be lawful); Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding acts of torture, execution, and disappearance were clearly outside of Ferdinand
Marcos' authority as president, and thus he was not immunized under the FSIA); Trajano
v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 978 F.2d 493, 497-98 (9th Cir. 1992) (footnote omitted)
(citation omitted) (finding that FSIA immunity extended to individual officials would not
bar claims for human rights abuses because such claims were "beyond the scope" of the
official's authority and involved acts "the sovereign has not empowered the official to do");
Doe I v. Qui, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1282, 1286-87 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (refusing to afford im-
munity to a Chinese government official for abuses including torture and arbitrary deten-
tion against Falung Gong followers, although noting such acts were prohibited by Chinese
law). But see Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009); Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d
1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding the Israeli government took the position that the de-
fendants were acting in their official capacity when taking action for which they were
sued); Giraldo v. Drummond Co., 808 F. Supp. 2d 247, 250 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that al-
legations of jus cogens violations by former president of Colombia was not per se outside
the scope of authority, and thus did not defeat common law immunity, following prior Dis-
trict of Columbia federal court cases).
292. See Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 893; In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1472; Doe 1, 349
F. Supp. 2d at 1286-87.
293. See Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 893; In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1472; Doe 1, 349
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acting outside of the scope of his employment, and thus is liable
in his or her individual capacity.294 The hypocrisy is troubling.
B. Barriers to Bivens Claims
As mentioned above, the Westfall Act excludes Bivens claims,"'
meaning that claims against individual federal officials for viola-
tions of rights under the U.S. Constitution can proceed outside of
the context and limitations of the FTCA.295 Given the barriers of
the Westfall Act and the definition of scope of employment, and
given that there has yet to be a claim meeting the statutory ex-
ception of the Westfall Act for violations of international law, al-
iens suffering human rights violations are typically left only with
bringing Bivens claims for violations of rights protected by the
U.S. Constitution in order to achieve a remedy. 9 ' However,
Bivens has rarely provided a remedy for aliens over the last two
decades, especially those who have suffered abuse at the hands of
U.S. officials in response to the war on terror.9 s This is usually
because a court either grants the official qualified immunity after
finding that the victim's rights were not "clearly established" con-
stitutional rights299 or refuses to recognize a Bivens action based
on the doctrine of "special factors counselling hesitation,"3 °° typi-
cally involving national security."' These doctrines of qualified
immunity and "special factors counselling hesitation," just like
the Westfall Act and the FTCA, have worked to prevent aliens
F. Supp. 2d at 1286-87; see also Wilson, supra note 26, at 227-33.
294. See Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 893; In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1472; Doe 1, 349
F. Supp. 2d at 1286-87; see also discussion supra note 244.
295. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2006).
296. See id.
297. Aliens harmed by U.S. officials abroad can seek administrative relief through the
Foreign Claims Act ("FCA"), but only if they are injured through actions neither directly
nor indirectly related to combat, and only if they are deemed to be "friendly" to the United
States. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2734 to 2736 (2006). Claims must be filed within two years of ac-
cruing, and there is a $100,000 damages limit. Id. § 2734. For a variety of reasons, relief
under the FCA is difficult to ascertain. Importantly, it is a discretionary administrative
remedy, and there is no right to such a remedy under the Act. See id.
298. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001); Schweiker v. Chilicky,
487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 571 (2d Cir. 2009); Dotson v.
Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 2005).
299. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
300. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 396 (1971).
301. See, e.g., Beattie v. Boeing Co., 43 F.3d 559, 563 (10th Cir. 1994).
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whose rights have been violated and who have suffered injury
from obtaining a remedy.
1. Qualified Immunity
In 1971, the Supreme Court recognized private claims for viola-
tions of U.S. constitutional rights by federal officials in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.3 0 2
Subsequently, in 1974, the Supreme Court rejected absolute im-
munity for state officials' discretionary acts in violation of the
U.S. Constitution in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,03
finding that a state official could only claim official immunity for
such acts if he acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief
that his actions were lawful and valid30 In 1978, the Court ex-
tended this limited, qualified immunity to federal officials in Butz
v. Economou. 5 In extending limited, qualified immunity to feder-
al officers, the Court wanted to ensure individuals harmed by
federal officials violating their constitutional rights received a
remedy, albeit even from the federal officers themselves (who
could always seek indemnification), given the FTCA's exclusion
for discretionary acts, whether or not such discretion was
abused.06
302. 403 U.S. at 397.
303. The Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights reads in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immun-
ities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper, proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
304. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) ("It is the existence of reasonable
grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled
with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for
acts performed in the course of official conduct.").
305. 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
306. Id. at 505 (footnote omitted) ("If, as the Government argues, all officials exercising
discretion were exempt from personal liability, a suit under the Constitution could provide
no redress to the injured citizen, nor would it in any degree deter federal officials from
committing constitutional wrongs. Moreover, no compensation would be available from the
Government, for the Tort Claims Act prohibits recovery for injuries stemming from discre-
tionary acts, even when that discretion has been abused.").
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During the 1970s, the Supreme Court expanded the personal
liability of individual federal officials by finding they could be civ-
illy liable for federal constitutional torts and by limiting the scope
of immunity.17 But during the 1980s-the same decade that saw
the enactment of Westfall Act-this changed with the 1982 case
of Harlow v. Fitzgerald."  In Harlow, the Court found that
whether the officer was acting in bad faith was irrelevant for lia-
bility purposes." 9 The Court set forth the new standard that "gov-
ernment officials performing discretionary functions, generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their con-
duct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 310
In all but one case involving abuse of aliens by federal officials
after 2001 where a Bivens claim was asserted, including those
held in Guantanamo Bay, courts have granted qualified immuni-
ty to the federal officials, finding that they did not violate clearly
established "constitutional rights."3 '1 The lone recent case reject-
ing a qualified immunity defense for abuses at Guantanamo Bay,
Hamad v. Gates, was ultimately dismissed on other grounds.312
In dismissing Bivens claims on the basis of qualified immunity,
courts have relied on the fact that the alien plaintiffs (including
those held at Guantanamo Bay) were outside of the United States
307. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; see also Butz, 438 U.S. at 50; Scheuer, 416 U.S. at
247.
308. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
309. Id.; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975); Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48.
310. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
311. See Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Rasul v. Myers (Rasul 1),
563 F.3d 527, 529-30, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Al Janko v. Gates, 831 F. Supp. 2d 272, 280
n.13 (D.D.C. 2011); A1-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 112 n.5 (D.D.C. 2010).
312. See No. C1O-591MJP, 2011 WL 1253167, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2011). Apply-
ing the heightened standards of Iqbal v. Ashcroft, the Court dismissed the case against
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on the basis that the complaint did not adequately al-
lege his personal involvement in the constitutional violations; the fact that he continued
the policies of unlawful arbitrary and prolonged detention was not enough. Id. at *5 (ap-
plying Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). In addition, in an earlier decision, the Court
dismissed numerous additional defendants on the basis that the Court lacked personal
jurisdiction over them, rejecting Plaintiffs arguments that it could assert personal juris-
diction over all defendants on several different bases. Hamad v. Gates, No. C10-591MJP,
2010 WL 4511142, at *2-4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 2, 2010). The fact that an alien would have to
file dozens of cases against officials, albeit sued in their individual capacity, but for consti-
tutional violations under color of law, rather than one case in one jurisdiction, is yet an-
other practical barrier to justice in these cases.
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when their rights were violated, and thus it was not clearly estab-
lished that they possessed rights under the United States Consti-
tution.313 Unfortunately, the exact perimeter of constitutional
rights an alien possesses is still developing, and when and under
what circumstances an alien outside the geographic borders of
the United States is afforded constitutional rights vis-A-vis feder-
al officials, is somewhat unclear." ' Prior Supreme Court cases
have indicated that aliens likely have no constitutional rights
outside of U.S. territories, but within such territories, do have
rights under the Constitution.3 5 In the 2008 landmark case of
Boumediene v. Bush, however, the Supreme Court found that al-
iens held at Guantanamo Bay at a minimum had a constitutional
right to challenge their detention under the Constitution's non-
derogation provision of habeas, given that the United States had
de facto sovereignty over the base."6 But the Court left open the
question of exactly what constitutional rights might otherwise at-
tach to these men.1 7 In addition, given that the decision came in
2008, years after the United States began detaining men at
313. See Ali, 649 F.3d at 770; Rasul II, 563 F.3d at 528-30; Al Janko, 831 F. Supp. 2d
at 280; Al-Zahrani, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 112-13 n.5.
314. See infra notes 320-27 and accompanying text.
315. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("It is well established that
certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are una-
vailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders."); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) ("[W]e have rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth
Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States."); Johnson v. Ei.
sentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784-85 (1950) (stating that "[n]o decision of this Court" supported
the extension of Fifth Amendment rights to aliens overseas and the "practice of every
modern government is opposed to it"); Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
("The Supreme Court has long held that non-resident aliens who have insufficient contacts
with the United States are not entitled to Fifth Amendment protections."). However, start-
ing in 1901, the Court in a series of opinions known as the Insular Cases held that the
Constitution extended ex proprio vigore to the territories. See BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW,
THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCY OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 5 6 (2006). In these cases,
the Court also established the doctrine of territorial incorporation. Id. Under the same, the
Constitution applied fully only in incorporated territories such as Alaska and Hawaii, and
it partially applied in the new unincorporated territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Philippines. See id. at 5; De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States,
182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United
States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. N.Y. & Porto
Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901).
316. 553 U.S. 723, 755, 771 (2008).
317. In addition, in Boumediene, the Court rejected the government's argument that
the Constitution never applied extra-territorially. Id. at 755. It further discussed applying
a "functional test" for constitutional application extraterritorially in future cases. Id. at
756-59, 763-64. Thus, it is possible that Boumediene could change the landscape some-
what in future cases involving aliens abused by federal officials.
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Guantanamo Bay, the primary issue in these cases has been
whether the men's rights, even if they did have them, were "clear-
ly established" for purposes of qualified immunity.3 8
Until very recently, courts first needed to determine whether a
constitutional right existed before determining whether the right
was "clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity."'
That changed in 2009, when the Supreme Court ruled that courts
are no longer required to first determine whether rights existed,
but can move first to the question of whether such rights were
"clearly established," thereby relieving the courts of an obligation
to determine whether a constitutional right in fact existed and
was violated. 2' In cases involving aliens since that decision,
courts for the most part have only decided the issue of whether
the rights were clearly established, not reaching the issue of
whether such constitutional rights existed.32'
Although it is possible that cases involving abuses of aliens
taking place after the 2008 Boumediene decision might have
somewhat different results depending on the situation, qualified
immunity, at least for now, is one doctrine that severely limits al-
iens' rights to seek a remedy under the Constitution.
2. "Special Factors Counselling Hesitation"
Another relatively recent barrier to aliens obtaining a remedy
for violations of their rights has been the doctrine of "special fac-
tors counselling hesitation" under which courts have been reluc-
tant to recognize Bivens claims for constitutional violations in the
first place, regardless of whether such rights might be clearly es-
318. See James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional
Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1602, 1624-25 (2011).
319. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
320. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-37 (2009). As one might imagine, because
courts no longer have to first determine whether a right existed, there is less case law to
assist in determining whether a right is or was in fact clearly established.
321. See supra note 314. In one case prior to 2009, the D.C. Circuit found that the Con-
stitution did not confer rights to detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Rasul v. Myers (Rasul 1),
512 F.3d 644, 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 2008). However, in Hamad v. Gates, a district court in
Washington State, in what is so far the only case involving a former Guantanamo Bay de-
tainee rejecting qualified immunity for constitutional right violations at Guantanamo Bay,
found detainees had such rights, relying on Boumediene. No. C10-591 MJP 2012 WL
1253167, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2012).
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tablished.31 2 In Bivens cases brought by aliens for injuries arising
out of U.S. officials' acts ostensibly carrying out some sort of for-
eign policy goal-including the cases involving the war on ter-
ror-in all but one case, Hamad u. Gates,"'3 courts have cited
"special factors counselling hesitation" related to national securi-
ty in refusing to recognize a Bivens remedy-even if the plaintiffs
would have otherwise met the requirements for such a claim. 4
Yet, in two of three analogous cases involving U.S. citizens alleg-
ing injuries involving foreign policy or military actions related to
the war on terror, courts have rejected defense arguments that
"special factors counselling hesitation" should preclude such rem-
edies. The courts have specifically stated that cases involving
aliens and are distinguishable from those involving U.S. citizens
in rejecting Bivens claims based on special factors.2 Such distinc-
322. The phrase comes from Bivens, in which the Supreme Court explained that such a
remedy could be afforded because that "case involve[d] no special factors counselling hesi-
tation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971). The Court has recognized
special factors counselling hesitation in precluding Bivens actions for U.S. soldiers injured
while serving, concluding that "the unique disciplinary structure of the Military Estab-
lishment" precluded a Bivens action for harm to military personnel through activity inci-
dent to service. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 679 (1987) (quoting Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)).
323. See 2011 WL 6130413, at *3. The case was brought by a former Guantanamo Bay
detainee and is the only case brought by an alien involving the war on terror where a fed-
eral court has rejected the "special factors counselling hesitation" doctrine, finding that
such factors did not preclude a Bivens claim. Id.
324. See All v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 774 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d
559, 574-75 (2d Cir. 2009); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (citing Chappell, 462 U.S. at 298); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (citing Rasul I, 512 F.Sd at 672-73 (Brown, J., concurring)); A1-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld,
684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 112 (D.D.C. 2010); In re Iraq & Afg. Detainee Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d
85, 103 (D.D.C 2007) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S., at 396).
325. See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 974 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004); Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1020 (N.D. Cal.
2009)) (rejecting arguments that "special factors counselling hesitation" precluded Bivens
claims brought by U.S. citizens), reh'g granted, Vance v. Rumsfeld, Nos. 10-1687 & 10-
2442, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22083, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011); Padila, 633 F. Supp. 2d
at 1025 (same), rev'd on other grounds, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012). However, in Lebron u.
Rumsfeld, the district court and appellate court found that "special factors counselling
hesitation" precluded a Bivens claim brought by Mr. Padilla's mother. 764 F. Supp. 2d 787,
800 (D.S.C. 2011), affd, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012). Given this case, as well as the fact
that Padilla, in his own case, was ultimately found to be without a remedy due to the
Ninth Circuit dismissing on qualified immunity grounds, the double standard for U.S. citi-
zens and foreign citizens with regard to Bivens claims might not be as stark as was sug-
gested by the district court cases. See Padilla, 678 F.3d at 761-62, 768.
326. See Vance, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 974 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532; Padilla, 633 F.
Supp. 2d at 1020); Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
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tions are difficult to defend when one examines the analyses more
closely; when doing so, a double-standard becomes apparent.
The first case brought by an alien where a court found special
factors counseled hesitation in recognizing a Bivens claim for in-
juries arising out of national security or foreign policy decisions
was Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, a 1985 opinion from the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. That case involved, among
other things, Nicaraguan citizens who suffered injuries at the
hands of U.S.-supported "contra" rebels bringing civil tort actions
against certain U.S. officials for their covert vicarious involve-
ment in the injuries.329 In that case, the court found that Congress
was to determine whether a remedy should exist and not the
courts, noting that "the special needs of foreign affairs must stay
our hand in the creation of damage remedies against military and
foreign policy officials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of
foreign subjects causing injury abroad." ' 9 In so deciding, the court
also cited the danger of foreign citizens using the courts to ob-
struct U.S. foreign policy as one reason it should leave to Con-
gress the judgment whether a damage remedy should exist.30
The 2007 case In re Iraq & Afghanistan Detainees Litigation
was the first to consider whether special factors counseled hesita-
tion in recognizing a Bivens remedy for aliens arrested in the
wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq."' The plaintiffs alleged
they were innocent civilians illegally detained and subjected to
torture and abuse by the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan.332
After first finding that rights under the Constitution did not ex-
tend to the plaintiffs because the events occurred in foreign terri-
tories,"' the court found that special factors counselling hesita-
tion also precluded the recognition of a Bivens claim, citing
Sanchez-Espinoza.3"4 Under the "special factors counselling hesi-
327. 770 F.2d at 208 (citing Chappell, 462 U.S. at 298).
328. Id. at 205.
329. Id. at 209.
330. Id. Of course, that danger also exists with U.S. citizens, albeit there is an argu-
ment that there is less risk of this occurring.
331. 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2007).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 95 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001);
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
334. Id. at 103-04 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
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tation" analysis, the court first indicated that such a decision re-
garding whether a remedy existed in the first place might be con-
stitutionally within the legislature's power and not its own. 11 The
court noted the doctrine did not go to the merits of a particular
remedy, but to who should decide whether a remedy should be
provided.33 However, it also found that even if it was within its
constitutional power, those same special factors favored allowing
Congress to decide the scope of the remedy.37
The plaintiffs argued that nothing precluded claims against the
military for abuses, but the court rejected that argument in the
context of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars." s It noted that "author-
izing monetary damages remedies against military officials en-
gaged in an active war would invite enemies to use our own fed-
eral courts to obstruct the Armed Forces' ability to act decisively
and without hesitation in defense of our liberty and national in-
terests." '339 The court opined that the use of discovery could ham-
per national security, that such cases would cause morale prob-
lems, and even might cause lower-level soldiers to question their
superiors' authority, and that commanders might hesitate in tak-
ing actions if they were at risk for personal liability.34 °
Similar decisions in cases brought by alien plaintiffs alleging
mistreatment in either Afghanistan, Iraq, or at Guantanamo Bay
were issued in fairly quick succession."' In Rasul v. Myers, after
finding that the officials would be entitled to qualified immunity
in the Bivens claim, the court indicated that it would also find
that special factors counselling hesitation would preclude a
Bivens claim for aliens who had been held and allegedly tortured
at Guantanamo Bay, citing the danger of obstructing U.S. na-
tional security policy.342 The court relied on the Sanchez-Espinoza
403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971); Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 208).
335. Id. at 103-04 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,
304 (1983); Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 208).
336. Id. at 103 (quoting Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 208).
337. Id. at 103-04 (citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988); Bush v. Lu-
cas, 462 U.S. 367, 380-90 (1983)).
338. Id. at 105.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. See Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Rasul v. Meyers (Rasal II), 563
F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Rasul v. Meyers (Rasul 1), 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
342. Rasul II, 563 F.3d at 532 n.5 (citing Rasul 1, 512 F.3d at 672-73 (Brown, J., con-
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holding that "the special needs of foreign affairs must stay our
hand in the creation of damage remedies against military and
foreign policy officials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of
foreign subjects causing injury abroad. 3 4
Ali v. Rumsfeld also involved a civil suit by Afghanis and Iraqis
unlawfully held and abused in Afghanistan and Iraq.3" In refus-
ing to even consider a Bivens claim, the court cited previous deci-
sions and Sanchez-Espinoza for the proposition that "the danger
of foreign citizens' using the courts in [such situation] to obstruct
the foreign policy of our government is sufficiently acute that we
must leave to Congress the judgment whether a damage remedy
should exist.
45
Arar v. Ashcroft is an important case in the Bivens context be-
cause unlike other plaintiffs who also had to overcome the hurdle
of whether the Constitution applied to them outside of the United
States' geographical borders, part of Mr. Arar's claim was that
U.S. officials violated his rights while holding him at JFK airport
in New York before sending him back to Syria where he was tor-
tured. 46 In 2009, the Second Circuit declined to extend a Bivens
cause of action for Mr. Arar, finding that "rendition" was a "new
context" in which the court was reluctant to extend Bivens citing
"special factors counselling hesitation," and finding it was up to
Congress to clarify whether any remedy was available in the con-
text of rendition.
3 47
These cases involving aliens stand in direct contrast to those of
Vance v. Rumsfeld35 and Padilla v. Yoo, " each involving a U.S.
curring); Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 209).
343. Id. In Rasul I, Judge Brown's concurrence opined that he would have relied on
special factors counselling hesitation in refusing to grant a Bivens remedy, something the
majority opinion in that case did not address. 512 F.3d at 672. He noted that allowing
Bivens claims would allow enemies to obstruct our foreign policy, and he clearly viewed
the allowance of a Bivens remedy for detainees held and tortured at Guantanamo Bay as
an intrusion into executive and congressional powers. Id. at 672-73.
344. 649 F.3d at 764.
345. Id. at 774 (quoting Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 209).
346. See 585 F.3d 559, 565-67 (2d Cir. 2009).
347. Id. at 572-73, 577 (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 538, 550 (2007)).
348. 694 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Ill. 2010). This case, along with the ruling that special
factors counselling hesitation did not preclude a Bivens claim, was reversed by the Sev-
enth Circuit. Vance v. Rumsfeld, Nos. 10-1687 & 10-2442, 2012 WL 5416500, at *8 (7th
Cir. Nov. 7, 2012).
349. 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 678 F.3d 748 (9th
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citizen bringing a civil action for damages against U.S. officials
arising from actions related to the War on Terror.
In Padilla, U.S. citizen Jose Padilla, brought a civil action
against John Yoo, a former deputy attorney general, which in-
cluded a Bivens action for both his detention and his treatment
while detained.35 The court found there were no special factors
counselling hesitation in allowing a Bivens remedy, distinguish-
ing it from other cases where courts have found special factors ex-
isted, noting, among other things, that it did not involve deten-
tion and interrogation of aliens abroad.35 But the court did not
explain exactly how that was a distinguishing factor or why it
made any difference.
The same is true of Vance v. Rumsfeld." ' In that 2010 decision,
the court found that special factors did not counsel hesitation in
recognizing a Bivens remedy for a U.S. citizen who was subjected
to detention by U.S. agents while working for a private Iraqi se-
curity firm. The court heavily relied on In re Iraq & Afghani-
stan Detainees Litigation in noting that the court's primary con-
cerns in extending Bivens in the context of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan was limited to non-citizens"' due to the prospect of a
judicial remedy for aliens engaged in battle against the United
States.*5 At the same time, the court noted its reluctance to give
high-ranking officials a "blank check" to do as they pleased with
regard to American citizens, citing the Supreme Court for the
proposition that "[elven the war power does not remove constitu-
tional limitations safeguarding essential liberties."356 Yet, the
Cir. 2012).
350. Id. at 1014.
351. Id. at 1025. The case was reversed by the Ninth Circuit on other grounds-finding
the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity and never reaching the Bivens issue.
Padilla, 678 F.3d at 768.
352. 694 F. Supp. 2d 957.
353. Id. at 975.
354. Id. at 974-75; see In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (DD.C.
2007).
355. 694 F. Supp. 2d at 974-75 (citing In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp.
2d at 105-06). The court relied exclusively on precedent concerning "enemy aliens" to sup-
port the aversion to a judicial remedy against military officials.
356, Id. at 975 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426
(1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Vance court does not explain sufficiently why this statement
should not also apply to aliens.357
The growth and expansion of "special factors counselling hesi-
tation" in these Bivens claims is yet another barrier for those in-
jured by U.S. officials and seeking relief, especially for aliens. It is
an especially troubling development. The use of "special factors
counselling hesitation" has precluded claims of torture, CIDT,
and prolonged arbitrary detention in the context of the War on
Terror, even though courts are simply being asked to exercise
their "time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of re-
viewing and resolving claims.""35 The Supreme Court has on nu-
merous occasions indicated that the courts have a role in review-
ing and remedying the acts of the executive and our country's
military, especially when individual liberties are at staket *s Yet,
for aliens, this history is being eclipsed.
C. Political Question Doctrine
If an alien seeks a judicial remedy from a U.S official and is
somehow able to survive the Westfall Act, the FTCA, or Bivens, or
if the alien seeks a remedy from a U.S. citizen or corporation, an-
other potential roadblock will face is the political question doc-
trine. The political question doctrine traces its roots to the early
case of Marbury u. Madison,"'0 decided just fourteen years after
the enactment of the Alien Tort Statute.3 61 In Marbury, the Su-
preme Court articulated what we now refer to as the "political
357. Of course, it was the court's role to distinguish the case before it from other cases,
not to explain the rationale of the other cases. However, not even a footnote suggests any
discontent with the cases involving alien plaintiffs.
358. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004).
359. See, e.g., id. at 536 ("Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for
the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of
conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties
are at stake."); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 523 (1985) ("lDespite our recognition of
the importance of [the Attorney General's activities in the name of national security] to
the safety of our Nation and its democratic system of government, we cannot accept the
notion that restraints are completely unnecessary."); Home Bldg. & Loan, 290 U.S. at 426
("[E]ven the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential
liberties.").
360. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). The case is best known for establishing the Su-
preme Court's power of judicial review of acts of Congress. Id. at 177-78.
361. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77.
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question doctrine" by stating the oft-quoted admonition: "Ques-
tions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court.' '62
The modern political question doctrine was set forth in the
1962 case of Baker v. Carr 63 In Baker, the Supreme Court at-
tempted to give meaning to the issue of what constituted a politi-
cal question. 4 In so doing, it set forth six factors, or situations,
the presence of which could suggest that a political question
might exist ("Baker factors").366 The Court explained that a politi-
cal question likely exists if one of the following prominently exists
on the surface of a case:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of de-
ciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unques-
tioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the poten-
tiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by vari-
ous departments on one question. 6
The Court further held that one of the above factors, or situa-
tions, must be "inextricable from the case at bar" for the case to
be nonjusticiable on political question grounds."7 The Court also
noted that the analysis of whether a political question exists in
each case requires "a discriminating analysis of the particular
question posed," including the history of its management by the
political branches, its susceptibility to judicial handling, and the
possible consequences of judicial action.3 6
Eventually, the political question doctrine emerged in human
rights litigation, with the doctrine having been raised in approx-
imately thirty-three cases typically brought under ATS or the
362. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170.
363. 369 U.S. 186, 209-11 (1962).
364. Id.
365. Id. at 217.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 211-12.
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TVPA"' Of these cases, courts have dismissed approximately
twelve based on the political question doctrine, nearly one-third
of those brought.37 In nearly every case involving a defendant
who was a foreign official or organization where the political
question doctrine was raised, courts have systematically refused
to reject these cases on political question grounds, allowing them
to proceed against the foreign defendant.371 Yet, in all five cases
brought against U.S. officials where the political question doc-
trine was raised, the courts dismissed the cases as nonjusticiable
under the doctrine, leaving injured aliens without a remedy.372 In
other words, courts are willing to adjudicate cases on behalf of al-
iens where foreign officials or groups are accused of human right
abuses, but refuse to do so when the claims involve U.S. officials
who are committing human rights abuses.373
The first case, Schneider v. Kissinger, involved claims brought
by the children of a Chilean general allegedly killed during the
course of his kidnapping by plotters during the Chilean coup in
1970, for violation of customary international law under the
TVPA and the ATS against former national security advisor Hen-
ry Kissinger, and for torts under the FTCA against the United
369. Thirty-three cases were located where the political question doctrine was raised
against claims for international human rights law violations under the ATS, the TVPA, or
in some cases, the FTCA. It is possible there are more cases that eluded the thorough
search.
370. See infra notes 371-395 and accompanying text.
371. There are four human rights cases where the political question doctrine was
raised that involved foreign defendants (or defendants who were foreign officials at the
time of the alleged abuse), but all were allowed to proceed against the individuals. See,
e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845-46 (11th Cir. 1996) (involving a former Ethi-
opian official accused of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing war crimes and other human
rights abuses by the self-proclaimed president of Serbia); Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp.
2d 473, 477-79 (D. Md. 2009) (involving a former Peruvian army lieutenant accused of tor-
ture and other abuses arising out of a massacre on a village); Linder v. Calero-
Portocarrero, 251 F.3d 178, 183 (D.D.C. 2001) (involving claims against a Nicaraguan con-
tra leader). But see Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 10 (2d Cir. 2009) (involving one exception
in which the case was against an official of the Israeli government which was a close ally
to the United States).
372. See Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 415 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 881
(2008); Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Bancoult v.
McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 2006); A1-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-
9, 40-41 (D.D.C. 2010); Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 254 (D.D.C. 2004),
affd 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
373. See Harbury, 522 F.3d at 415; Gonzalez-Vera, 449 F.3d at 1261; Bancoult, 445
F.3d at 429; Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 9; Schneider, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
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States."4 The court found that the claims intruded upon the exec-
utive's ability to conduct foreign relations and were thus not re-
viewable by the court because the acts at issue constituted foreign
policy activity. 75
Similarly, Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger involved claims that
then-U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was actively in-
volved in oppressing and eliminating individuals opposed to
Chile's Pinochet regime.376 The court dismissed the case on politi-
cal question grounds, finding it would have to delve into ques-
tions of policy that were textually committed to the executive
branch in order to adjudicate the case."'
A third case, Bancoult v. McNamara, involved the decision by
former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to forcibly remove
residents from Chagos Archipelago in the Indian Ocean in order
to construct a U.S. military base."6 Although the plaintiffs con-
ceded that the decision to establish a naval base was a foreign
policy decision, they argued that the manner in which the estab-
lishment of the base was carried out, which involved alleged hu-
man rights abuses, was reviewable."' The court found that the
measures taken to depopulate the area were inextricably inter-
twined with the underlying strategy of creating a military pres-
ence, and thus the claims were non-reviewable political ques-
tions."'
Similarly, in the more recent case of Harbury v. Hayden, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia dismissed a case
brought by the widow of a Guatemalan rebel fighter against vari-
ous CIA officials for state common law torts under the FTCA.3s'
She claimed that the CIA officials, acting in concert with the
Guatemalan government to suppress rebellion, were legally re-
374. 310 F. Supp. 2d at 254-57, 266-67.
375. Id. at 267.
376. 449 F.3d at 1261, 1264.
377. Id. at 1263.
378. 445 F.3d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
379. Id. at 436.
380. Id. at 436.
381. 522 F.3d 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The case did not bring claims for violation of
international law, but is included in this discussion due to the fact that the common law
claim was one of torture. Id.
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sponsible for her husband's torture and death in 1992."52 The
court dismissed the case as nonjusticiable under the political
question doctrine, relying on the three above-mentioned cases."'
Although the plaintiff challenged specific acts and not general ex-
ecutive foreign policy decisions, the court rejected the argument,
381finding the case indistinguishable from the prior cases.
Another recent case has also been dismissed by a federal court
on grounds of nonjusticability under the political question doc-
trine. In Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, a District of Columbia district court
ruled that President Obama's decision to engage in a targeted
killing on foreign soil was not judicially reviewable."'
The political question doctrine has been raised only in two of
the recent cases against former or current U.S. officials in cases
arising out of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in both of
those cases, the courts did not address the doctrine, since they
had dismissed the cases on other grounds."' In these cases, the
same concerns raised by the political question doctrine were
raised in the context of "special factors counselling hesitation" as
part of their Bivens claim. 87
As mentioned above, cases against foreign officials have nearly
unanimously been allowed to go forward without being dismissed
on political question grounds as they have against U.S. officials.
Any argument that the cases involving U.S. officials, especially
cases that challenge decision-making in the foreign affairs con-
text, fit more traditionally within the political question doctrine
than do cases against foreign defendants 8 is questionable given
382. Id. at 415.
383. Id. at 420 (citing Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.D.C. 2004); Goza-
lez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Bancoult, 445 F.2d 427).
384. Id. at 421.
385. 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46 (D.D.C. 2010).
386. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 767 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2011); In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees
Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 119 (D.D.C. 2007).
387. Ali, 649 F.3d at 774; In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 103.
388. See Kimberly Breedon, Remedial Problems at the Intersection of the Political Ques-
tion Doctrine, the Standing Doctrine, and the Doctrine of Equitable Discretion, 34 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 523, 550-51 (2008). However, that is not to say that the manner in which de-
cisions are carried out, including military actions, violate international law and fit more
squarely within the political question doctrine. See Gwynne Skinner, The Nonjusticiability
of Palestine: Human Rights Litigation and the (Mis)application of the Political Question
Doctrine, 35 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 99 (2012).
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that the Supreme Court has clarified that claims arising out of
ongoing conflicts in which the United States takes an interest, in-
cluding challenges to U.S. military actions, do not render them
nonjusticiable."' Moreover, the dismissal of what should other-
wise be justiciable cases is in direct contradiction to what the
founders of the United States so strongly desired for what was
then their new, young country: that the United States provide a
forum and remedy for civil tort cases alleging violation of the law
of nations, 90 a desire accomplished through the enactment of the
ATS in 1789.391
It should be noted that although a few cases against U.S. cor-
porations have also been dismissed based on the political question
doctrine,392 others against corporations for their complicity in hu-
man rights abuses have been allowed to proceed." 3 This is one ar-
ea that shows some promise for aliens whose rights have been vi-
389. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 507, 527 (2004) (rejecting separation of powers
argument proffered to limit judicial review of "military decision-making in connection with
an ongoing conflict"); see also Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 679-86 (1900); Koohi v.
United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992).
390. There is significant consensus among scholars that at the time of our country's
founding, the founders sought to ensure that the young country would comply with the law
of nations, which included providing a remedy for violations of the law of nations. See, e.g.,
CASTO, supra note 6, at 135-36; Casto, supra note 31, at 490; D'Amato, supra note 31, at
63; Randall, supra note 9, at 11-12; Slaughter, supra note 31, at 15..
391. William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to
the "Originalists", HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 224 (1996).
392. Corrie v. Caterpillar Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 979-80, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2007); Saldafia
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., No. CV 11-8957 PA, at *2-4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2012); Mu-
jica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1164, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
Four earlier cases against corporations were also dismissed under the political question
doctrine because they involved World War II reparations that were the subject of negotia-
tions and treaties between countries. See Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 562 (9th
Cir. 2005); In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F. Supp. 2d 370,
372 (D.N.J. 2001); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 484-85 (D.N.J. 1999);
Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 282 (D.N.J. 1999).
393. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d. 736, 757 (9th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1208 (9th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345,
346 (D.C. Cir. 2007); AI-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 (D. Md. 2010), rev'd
and remanded sub nom. on other grounds, AI-Shimari v. CAC1 Intern., Inc., 679 F.3d 205,
224 (4th Cir. 2012); In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 602 (E.D. Va.
2009); In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Al
Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 700, 708 (E.D. Va. 2009), reo'd and
remanded on other grounds, 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F.
Supp. 2d 10, 15 (D.D.C. 2005); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7,
64 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.
2d 347, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), dismissed on other grounds, 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
2013]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
olated through aiding and abetting by U.S. corporations. Howev-
er, the future of these cases is unclear, given that the Supreme
Court is considering whether corporations can even be sued under
international law.394 In addition, although courts have thus far re-
fused to dismiss recent cases on political question grounds involv-
ing federal contractor abuses, the future of those cases based on
other doctrines remains murky. 9 5
D. Case-Specific Deference
Another doctrine grounded in the separation of powers that al-
so has the potential to prevent aliens from seeking and acquiring
a remedy for violation of their rights is "case specific deference," a
relatively new, prudential doctrine the Supreme Court set forth
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.0 In Sosa, the Court pointed to an
ATS case involving corporate complicity in South Africa's earlier
apartheid policy as an example of a case where the doctrine might
preclude the courts from adjudicating a case otherwise properly
before them.397 In the case, the South African government told the
federal district court that it had made a deliberate choice to have
a Truth and Reconciliation process address the human rights vio-
lations of the South African apartheid regime, and indicated to
the court that the ATS case interfered with that policy choice.398
The United States executive branch agreed.399 The Court said that
in such cases, "courts should give serious weight to the Executive
Branch's view of the case's impact on foreign policy.""4
Although this policy has been discussed in some human rights
cases and used as basis of dismissal for several, usually along
with the political question doctrine, it has not developed enough
394. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F,3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, - U.S. -, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
395. Al Shimari, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 720, rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 658
F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011); Al-Quraishi, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 715, rev'd and remanded sub
nom. on other grounds, Shimari v. CACI Intern., Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 224 (4th Cir. 2012).
One issue that may result in the prevention of relief is a doctrine that will require federal
preemption of the state tort claims brought in the cases and require that they proceed un-
der the FTCA, which is currently at issue in the cases.
396. 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
397. Id. (citing In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1380-81).
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
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to ascertain whether or not it will have a significant impact on
cases brought by aliens separate from the political question doc-
trine.40 '
IV. FOUNDERS' CONCERNS REMAIN RELEVANT TODAY
It seems fairly clear that the founders of the United States and
the early generations of lawmakers believed it was important, if
not critical, to ensure that the United States provide access to ju-
dicial remedies to aliens whose rights under international law are
violated, including when they are violated by U.S. officials and
citizens. The ability of aliens to seek a remedy for such acts con-
tinued fairly unabated for most of the 1800s and well into the lat-
ter part of the twentieth century.
The reasons for this commitment to provide a remedy existed
in order to comply with international law, to demonstrate legiti-
macy in the eyes of the rest of the world, and to avoid embroiling
the young country in unnecessary international and foreign con-
flicts.0 ' This was important to the early generations, given that at
the time, the treatment of another country's citizens while they
were abroad and denials of justice to them was often the justifica-
tion for the home country to engage in armed conflict or even to
declare war.408
401. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 58-62, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)) (rejecting case specific deference as a basis for
dismissal, and looking to Baker factors); In re S. Afri. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at
281, 286 (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701-02 (2004)) (rejecting
dismissal on the basis of case-specific deference and political question doctrines); Khu-
lumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 261-62 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing doctrine, but
not determining whether dismissal on such basis was warranted); Whiteman v. Dorothe-
um GMBH & COKG, 431 F.3d 57, 74 (2d Cir. 2005) (dismissing Nazi-era case against Aus-
trian company to recover property on basis of both political question and case-specific def-
erence doctrines); Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 49-52 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(dismissing claims of "comfort women" against Japan on grounds of political question and
case-specific deference doctrines); Beaty v. Iraq, 480 F. Supp. 2d 60, 78-79 (D.D.C.) (reject-
ing dismissal on the grounds of case specific deference), revd on other grounds, 556 U.S.
848 (2007); Almog v. Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting dis-
missal based on case-specific deference); Taveras v. Taveras, 397 F. Supp. 2d 908, 915
(S.D. Ohio 2005) (dismissing claims in a child abduction case partly on the basis of case-
specific deference).
402. See D'Amato, supra note 31, at 64-65.
403. See discussion, supra, at Section I.A; see also D'Amato, supra note 31, at 64.
2013]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
In fact, allowing claims under the ATS helped the U.S. gov-
ernment in the early years avoid foreign policy entanglements. 4
This was illustrated quite well by the 1795 opinion by Attorney
General Bradford indicating that the British could sue an Ameri-
can slave trader under the ATS for violations of the law of na-
tions.4 5 In 1794, the slave trader, assisted by several other U.S.
citizens, led a French fleet in an attack upon the British Colony of
Sierra Leone, plundering it for two weeks.06 The British Ambas-
sador protested.0 7 As Professor Anthony D'Amato has explained,
if the United States chose not to respond to Great Britain, Great
Britain would have viewed this as a denial of justice-a cause for
war.4 00 Had the United States chosen to pay reparations to Britain
due to its citizens' conduct, France would have been angered and
possibly provoked into military hostilities. 4 The government
turned over the issue to Attorney General Bradford, who wrote
the opinion, which suggested that the British citizens injured
could sue to recover damages under the ATS."0 As Professor
D'Amato describes,
Here, then, was the remedy. By providing for an impartial system of
federal courts that had jurisdiction over such controversies, the new
Government could shun political entanglements and no-win situa-
tions. The "law of nations" would serve as an impartial standard, ac-
ceptable to all nations, and torts committed by American citizens in
violation of that law would be redressed through its application by
411federal courts.
Of course, the reality is that the status of the United States
and its role in the world have greatly changed from the time of
the founding and the 1800s. It is unlikely that today, for example,
the failure to compensate an alien for a tort in violation of the law
of nations will lead directly to a country attacking the United
States. This may support an argument that providing aliens a
404. See D'Amato, supra note 31, at 66.
405. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795); D'Amato, supra note 31, at
66.
406. D'Amato, supra note 31, at 66.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. id.
410. Id. (quoting Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. at 59); see also Bradley, supra
note 4, at 635 (describing the diplomatic correspondence at issue).
411. D'Amato, supra note 31, at 66.
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remedy for a violation of their rights under international law just
is not as critical or as important as it once was. Moreover, one
could argue that given the growth of extraterritorial activity in
the world and the threat modern terrorism presents to the United
States, allowing officials of the military or executive branch to
take actions that might violate international law without the
threat of a lawsuit is imperative to the security of United States.
Certainly, the role of the United States has changed, and large-
scale threats against our country have increased. However, not-
withstanding these realities, it continues to be in the interest of
our country's long-term national security and standing in the
world to comply with international law and to provide remedies
when executive and military officials violate the internationally
protected human rights of aliens. Failure to do so, as well as al-
lowing a hypocritical paradigm to exist wherein our own officials
are not held civilly accountable but foreign officials are, arguably
affects the long-term foreign policy interest of the United States.
Our founders understood the relationship between complying
with international law and foreign policy, and as Professor Casto
has concluded, "[T]he wisdom of their thoughts ... has not dimin-
ished with the passage of time."4"'
The effects of the United States' noncompliance with interna-
tional law, which continues to require a remedy for violations of
international law, include the United States losing credibility in
its commitment to human rights and the loss of goodwill amongst
other nations and their peoples that could cause foreign policy
problems and entanglements. As the noted legal scholar and his-
torian Charles Warren stated in 1922,
In the maintenance of the foreign relations of the United States on a
high and honorable level, and in the preservation of peace, no deci-
sions of the Court have played a more important part than have
those in which, from the outset of its history, it has upheld with the
utmost scrupulousness the sanctity of treaties and their strict con-
struction, regardless of the contentions of the Administration which
411happened to be in power.
As recently as 1980, our own executive branch, in a memoran-
dum to the Second Circuit in a seminal ATS human rights case,
412. Casto, supra note 31, at 510.
413. See 2 WARREN, sapra note 84, at 40.
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made this same argument.4 4 In that memorandum, the executive
branch argued that not adjudicating ATS claims for customary
international law violations would compromise the foreign rela-
tions of the United States. It stated,
[B] efore entertaining a suit alleging a violation of human rights, a
court must first conclude that there is a consensus in the interna-
tional community that the right is protected and that there is a
widely shared understanding of the scope of this protection ...
When these conditions have been satisfied, there is little danger that
judicial enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts. To the
contrary, a refusal to recognize a private cause of action in these cir-
cumstances might seriously damage the credibility of our nation's
commitment to the protection of human rights.415
The importance of respecting human rights has been articulat-
ed repeatedly by U.S. administrations and is ostensibly part of
the United States' current foreign policy considerations. 16 Even
Congress has enacted a statute which provides that "a principal
goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote
the increased observance of internationally recognized human
rights by all countries. 4 7
This commitment has remained true even with the advent of
the war on terror. As President George W. Bush stated in 2002
during his State of the Union address: "[W]e have a great oppor-
tunity during this time of war [against terrorism] to lead the
world toward the values that will bring lasting peace ... America
will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human
414, Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filortiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980).
415. Id. at 20, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 604 (internal citation omitted).
416. There are numerous examples. In signing the Torture Victim Protection Act in
1991, President George H.W. Bush stated, "In this new era, in which countries throughout
the world are turning to democratic institutions and the rule of law, we must maintain
and strengthen our commitment to ensuring that human rights are respected every-
where." Presidential Statement on Signing the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 465, 466 (Mar. 12, 1992). Moreover, numerous U.S. laws condi-
tion foreign development, security, and investment assistance and trade benefits on com-
pliance with internationally recognized human rights. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2151(n)(a)
(2006) (addressing development assistance); Id. § 2304(a)(2) (2006) (addressing security
assistance); 7 U.S.C. § 1733C)(1) (2006) (addressing agricultural commodities).
417. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (2006).
[Vol. 47:555
ROADBLOCKS TO REMEDIES
dignity: [including] the rule of law [and] limits on the power of
the state ....18
Moreover, as career former diplomats stated in an amicus brief
in 2006,
[T]he U.S. government has always maintained that an effective war
against terrorism depends in part on building international respect
for human rights standards and the rule of law. We cannot effective-
ly demonstrate our commitment to these principles .. if we afford
those complicit in genocide, torture or murder more favorable treat-
ment than those who assist acts of terrorism. If we expect others to
cooperate with us, the United States must demonstrate its own
commitment to holding accountable those complicit in the violation
of universally recognized human rights.419
Thus, it appears that it continues to be in the interest of the
foreign policy of the United States to ensure that the United
States comply with international law, by not only ensuring its of-
ficials comply with such law in respecting the human rights of in-
dividuals, but ensuring that when they are violated, those aliens
have access to a remedy.
That remedy could, arguably, be diplomatic or even created by
Congress, but the remedy should be a judicial one for two rea-
sons. First, a judicial remedy was the original intent of the found-
ers, which they demonstrated by enacting the ATS. They believed
it wise to take the remedy out of the hands of the diplomats,
where remedies were not guaranteed and subjected to political
whims and weaknesses (either that was the reality, or perhaps
they were worried about perception of objectivity and fairness),
and put the remedy in the hands of the neutral judiciary. They
believed it wise for foreign policy reasons to ensure remedies in
this way, and this reasoning continues to be persuasive today.
Professor D'Amato brings this point home in his discussion out-
418. State of the Union, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 125, 138 (Feb. 4, 2002); see also
Remarks of Lorne W. Craner, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and La.
bor to the Heritage Foundation (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/rmI2001/6378.htm ("[M]aintaining the focus on human rights and democracy
world worldwide is an integral part of our response to the attack and is even more essen-
tial today than before September lth. They remain in our interest in promoting a stable
and democratic world.").
419. Brief of Amici Curiae Career Foreign Service Diplomats in Support of Neither
Party at 22-23, Corrie v. Caterpillar Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-36210),
2006 WL 2952508.
2013]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
lined above, stating, "[B]y providing for an impartial system of
federal courts that had jurisdiction over such controversies, the
new Government could shun political entanglements and no-win
situations."'42
Second, although there is no reason Congress could not create
the remedy, Congress itself has indicated that it prefers the
Courts to adjudicate such claims rather than be burdened with
such, as the historical description of the evolution of the FTCA
indicates.
V. CONCLUSION
After nearly 200 years of ensuring that remedies were provided
to aliens whose legal rights under international law were violated
by U.S. officials, a dramatic change occurred over the last thirty
years. Both courts and Congress have erected barriers to aliens
seeking such remedies against U.S. officials, even when such offi-
cials' conduct toward them violates international human rights
norms as well as the U.S. Constitution. These new barriers are
not only contrary to international law requirements that each na-
tion ensure a remedy for such injuries, they are contrary to the
clearly articulated and well-documented desires of the United
States' founders and numerous earlier generations, including
members of Congress and the judiciary. Moreover, the earlier
concerns regarding the effects on the country of noncompliance
with international law are still alive and well today. It is probable
that these barriers create long-term foreign policy concerns and
potential problems. This problem is exacerbated given that for-
eign officials are usually held liable for similar violations for
which U.S. officials are not held liable.
It is unclear if some of these barriers, such as the Westfall Act,
were intentionally or negligently erected. Regardless, there are
some actions that Congress and the courts can take to better en-
sure that the United States is in compliance with the founders'
intent and with international law's requirement of ensuring a
remedy for aliens whose rights are violated by the actions of U.S.
420. See D'Amato, supra note 31, at 66.
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officials, especially those engaging in violations of the customary
international law and the U.S. Constitution.
First, Congress should amend the Westfall Act to exclude
claims for violation of customary international law under the ATS
in the same way in which it excludes Bivens and statutory claims.
Congress should also define "scope of employment" used under
the Westfall Act as excluding egregious, intentional acts, and
should specify that federal common law rather than state re-
spondeat superior liability should be used to determine scope of
employment.
Alternatively, Congress could waive sovereign immunity for all
intentional acts by U.S. officials (at least intentional acts found
not to be within the scope of employment), not just those by law
enforcement or investigative personnel. Congress should also lim-
it the foreign country exception by excluding those areas under de
facto U.S. control, and/or limit claims where conflict of law de-
terminations would require the application of other countries'
laws.421 Congress should also specify that the "law of the place" in
FTCA actions can include claims for customary international law,
not just "state" law.
Until Congress makes the above statutory changes, wherever
the courts need to interpret ambiguous provisions in the FTCA,
courts should take into consideration the founders' desires and
Congress' intent, both in 1946 when it enacted the FTCA, and in
1988 when it enacted the Westfall Act. Courts should also look to
the Charming Betsy422 doctrine when interpreting the statute to
ensure their interpretations of ambiguous parts of the statute are
consistent with international law which requires a remedy when
aliens rights are violated by a country's citizens and officials. The
Charming Betsy doctrine provides that national statutes should
always be interpreted as consistent with international law, where
possible.423
421. Alternatively, Congress could provide a waiver for those torts that take place an-
ywhere in the world by a U.S. official, specifying what law to apply in order to eradicate
the problem of a foreign country's law supplying the choice of law in the case.
422. Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("It has also been ob-
served that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains.").
423. Id.
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Congress' intent in enacting the FTCA was to ensure sufficient-
ly prompt and adequate remedies for U.S. officials' violations of
the law, not to erect barriers to such remedies. In enacting the
Westfall Act, Congress meant to return the law to what it was
prior to Westfall v. Erwin. It did not intend a regime wherein no
liability remained for egregious and intentional violations by U.S.
non-law enforcement personnel, or to limit personal liability in
such cases. Thus, courts should reconsider their application of
state respondeat superior liability for purposes of "scope of em-
ployment" under the Westfall Act, and instead apply federal
common law to the question of scope of employment.
Courts should also re-think their application of "special factors
counselling hesitation," the political question doctrine, and case-
specific deference to cases involving allegations of serious human
rights abuses by U.S. officials in light of the founders' and earlier
generations' intent to ensure a remedy to aliens harmed by ac-
tions of U.S. officials, consistent with the current requirements of
international law. In particular, the courts should recognize that
the political question doctrine under Baker, as well as Bivens
"special factors counselling hesitation" doctrine are vague and
have been misapplied in a manner that not only implicates the
courts' own constitutional obligations to adjudicate claims, but al-
so have unfairly resulted in barriers to remedies. The courts
should view the political question doctrine as a jurisdictional doc-
trine and not a prudential one, and should recognize that the fac-
tors outlined in Baker are simply types of situations that might
indicate when a political question exists, not a list of conditions
that automatically signal a "political question" exists. Moreover,
the court should be very cautious with the "special factors coun-
selling hesitation" and "case-specific deference" prudential com-
mon law doctrines, and should significantly narrow these doc-
trines to ensure that the courts are complying with their Article
III constitutional obligations to adjudicate claims involving viola-
tions of law-whether or not such violations are by U.S. officials
and whether or not they involve the manner in which federal for-
eign policies or military decisions are being carried out. Moreover,
courts should be as cautious applying common law doctrines, such
as official immunity and the political question doctrine, as they
are in applying other common law doctrines in the absence of
Congressional direction.
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Only with these changes will the United States comport with
the deep desires of the founders to ensure compliance with inter-
national law and to provide remedies to aliens for violations
thereof-desires that continue to have relevance in our world to-
day.

